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CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS
by
James C. Chadwick*
HIS Article begins with a discussion of partnership law developments, continues into a discussion of corporation law developments,
and concludes with a discussion of securities law developments.
I.

PARTNERSHIP LAW DEVELOPMENTS

A. General Analysis
This discussion of partnership law developments generally follows the
"cradle to grave" sequence used in prior years' Surveys and is characteristic
of the formats of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act (TUPA)1 and the
Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act (TULPA). 2 Cases involving alleged breaches of fiduciary duty among partners, replacement of general
partners by limited partners, and an application of the partnership by estoppel rules to two corporations engaged in a single business enterprise highlight the cases arising during the survey period.
B. Formation and Existence of a Partnership
Three cases arising during the survey period involved whether certain relationships between persons constituted a partnership. In Medallion Homes,
Inc. v. Thermar Investments, Inc.3 two corporations, Thermar Investments,
Inc. and C. Foster Wooten, Inc., desired to acquire and develop a real estate
subdivision known as Quail Forest. Thermar, acting as the financier, entered into a contract for the sale of certain lots in the subdivision with the
owner of the subdivision, First City National Bank of Houston. The contract granted Thermar the right to purchase and resell certain lots in the
subdivision, but prohibited assignment by Thermar without the prior written
consent of First City. Notwithstanding the nonassignability clause in the
contract, Thermar executed a document that purported to assign to Wooten
an undivided one-half interest in the contract.4
* B.S., Pennsylvania State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University; Attorneyat-Law, Freytag, Perry, LaForce, Rubinstein & Teofan, Dallas, Texas. The author wishes to

thank Michelle D. Chadwick, Charles M. Hamilton and Michael C. Milam for their research
and editorial assistance and Professor Alan R. Bromberg for his insightful comments on drafts
of this Article.
1. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (Vernon 1970).
2. Id. art. 6132a.
3. 698 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
4. Thermar executed the assignment document with the expectation that First City
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During the period that the contract between Thermar and First City was
in force, Thermar entered into a contract for the sale of certain Quail Forest
lots to Medallion Homes, Inc. The assignment document, however, clouded
the title of the property and rendered Thermar unable to convey clear title to
the Quail Forest lots to Medallion as the contract required. 5
Medallion brought actions against Thermar and Wooten for damages resulting from an alleged breach of contract under the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (DTPA).6 Medallion also asserted that the relationship between Thermar and Wooten constituted a partnership formed to acquire and
develop the subdivision in an effort to impute to Thermar responsibility for
Wooten having recorded the assignment document. 7 The trial court found
that no partnership existed, and Medallion appealed the decision.
The appellate court reviewed the trial court record and concluded that
Thermar and Wooten clearly had intended at one point in time to form a
partnership to acquire and develop the subdivision. 8 Thermar's and Wooten's intent, however, was frustrated because First City never consented to
the purported assignment of the contract. Hence, the purported assignment
was invalid. Because the acquisition and development of the subdivision
could not be carried out without a valid assignment of the contract, the appellate court concluded that the parties had nothing on which to base the
partnership. 9 Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision that no partnership existed. 10
Alstan Corporationv. Board of Administration of Chimney Corners TownhousesII involved two corporations that developed a residential housing
complex known as Chimney Corners Townhouses. Alstan Corporation, a
construction company experienced in the construction of multifamily
projects, served as the general contractor in charge of constructing the complex. Stan Miller, president of Alstan, had been at all times the general manager of Alstan's operations. Miller and his father each owned fifty percent of
Alstan and twenty-five percent of Miller & Dryden, Inc. (M&D), a corporation formed solely for the purpose of owning the complex during its development stage. Kenny Dryden owned the remainder of M&D.
would approve the assignment.

First City, however, did not approve the assignment.

Thermar's purported assignment of the subdivision contract to Wooten therefore was invalid.
5. Thermar and First City later terminated their contract by agreement. First City ultimately sold the subdivision to Mac-Carey Properties, Inc. Medallion then purchased several
of the lots from Mac-Carey at a price higher than that provided in its original contract with
Thermar.
6. The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act § 17.50(a)(2) provides that a consumer may
maintain an action if the breach of an express or implied warranty is a producing cause of
actual damages. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
7. Medallion based this claim on § 6(1) of TUPA, which defines a partnership as "an
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 6(1) (Vernon 1970).
8. 698 S.W.2d at 404.
9. Id. The court cited no legal authority for its conclusion. Arguably, the court relied on
the absence of a business to be carried on. See TEX REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 6(1)
(Vernon 1970).
10. 698 S.W.2d at 404.
11. 713 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
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During the construction of the complex, Miller, in his capacity as general
manager of Alstan, made certain changes in the roof design of the townhouses. These changes caused leaks, which damaged several townhouses.
The board of administration of the complex demanded that Alstan and
M&D remedy the problem caused by the roof design. Upon their refusal to
do so, the board brought an action in district court against Alstan and M&D
to recover damages caused by defective workmanship in the construction of
the roofs and drainage systems.
After a jury trial, the district court rendered judgment that the board recover $422,000 against Alstan and M&D, jointly and severally. 12 Alstan
appealed on the ground that there was no evidence in the record to support a
finding that the two corporations were engaged in a joint venture.' 3 Specifically, Alstan contended that there had been no evidence presented that indicated the existence of an agreement between the corporations to share profits
and losses from the development of the complex. On appeal, the court relied
heavily on a short segment of Dryden's testimony in which he indicated that
he was Alstan's "partner" in the project.' 4 The court concluded that
Dryden's admission of partnership with Alstan was an implication that an
agreement existed between the two to divide the profits and losses from the
project. Therefore, the admission was of probative force, despite its somewhat conclusory or composite fact nature. 15 As a result, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's judgment and held Alstan liable for the damages to
16
the same extent as M&D.

In Russell v. French & Associates, Inc. 17 the court considered whether cer12. The board's pleadings, which alleged that Alstan and M&D had entered into a joint
venture to build and sell the Chimney Corners Townhouse complex, prompted the district
court's imposition of joint and several liability.
13. The four required elements of a Texas joint venture are: (1) a community of interest
in the venture; (2) an agreement to share profits; (3) an agreement to share losses; and (4) a
mutual right to control or manage the enterprise. Ayco Dev. Corp. v. G.E.T. Serv. Co., 616
S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex. 1981). Alstan did not appeal on the ground that the evidence was
insufficient to support the verdict.
14. 713 S.W.2d at 133. The court also relied on admissions that Miller had received construction draws from the project and that Dryden received a real estate commission through
M&D in connection with the deal. Id. at 134.
15. Id. The appellate court used as primary authority for this conclusion a Texas opinion
dating from 1856 which held that when an unimpeached witness states a fact as his own
knowledge, it must be taken that he had competent means of information and knowledge of
the fact, unless the contrary appears. Kottwitz v. Bagby, 16 Tex. 656, 662 (1856).
16. 713 S.W.2d at 134. Regarding the issue of community of interest, the appellate court
held that the interlocking ownership between Alstan and M&D constituted evidence thereof.
Id. Regarding the issue of mutual right of control, the appellate court held that the loose
fashion in which Miller managed the corporations constituted evidence thereof when coupled
with the interlocking ownership. Id.
17. 709 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) The TSA does not
apply to transactions between joint venturers. Brown v. Cole, 291 S.W.2d 704, 709 (Tex.
1956); Vick v. George, 671 S.W.2d 541, 546 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 686 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984). The TSA defines a security to include an investment
contract. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(A) (Vernon 1987). When the term is applied
to a joint venture, the Texas courts look to the meaning of "investment contract." Russell, 709
S.W.2d at 314. The United States Supreme Court has defined an investment contract as an
arrangement consisting of three elements: (1) a common enterprise, in which a person (2) expects to receive profits (3) solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. SEC v.
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tain interests in oil and gas wells constituted interests in a joint venture and,
therefore, were exempt from the Texas Security Act (TSA). In Russell, an
operator agreed to drill oil and gas wells on certain leases and to convey the
working interests in the wells to a partnership. The partnership would, in
turn, provide federal income tax benefits to a group of investors of which
French & Associates, Inc. was a member.
After the commencement of drilling operations, the investor group became dissatisfied with the arrangement and refused to pay the drilling costs
incurred by the operator. The operator then sued the investor group for the
operating costs. The investor group counterclaimed against the operator
and brought a third-party action against Russell, a promoter, seeking rescission of the agreement on the grounds of misrepresentation under the TSA
and common law fraud. The trial court rendered judgment against Russell
and the operator for rescission and for return of $1,440,000 of purchase
money.1 8 Russell and the operator appealed, contending that the trial court
erred in granting a rescission because the partnership constituted a joint venture and the investor group failed to show that the interests they purchased
therein constituted securities covered by the TSA.
The appellate court concluded that of the four required elements of a joint
venture, only the control element posed a genuine issue.1 9 Whether the parties had a mutual right of control of management of the enterprise was not a
clear issue in light of the limited involvement of the investors in the venture.
The appellate court, however, held the arrangement to be a joint venture as a
matter of law based on evidence that (1) the venture agreement described the
operator and the investor group as joint venturers, (2) the venture agreement
provided that the operator and the investor group would each have a fifty
percent vote on matters concerning the business of the venture and (3) the
investor group had exercised powers under the venture agreement to remove
an operator and replace it with another. 20 The transactions between the parties therefore were exempt from the TSA.
C. Partnerby Estoppel
When a person represents himself, or consents to another representing
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). The sale of an interest in a true joint venture or general
partnership generally does not involve the sale of a security because the venturers or partners
have the power to participate in the management of the entity and, therefore, the third element
of an investment contract is missing. The Texas Supreme Court has found that a party owning
a joint interest in a well, who did not retain any joint participation, control, or operation of the
mining effort, was not a joint venturer as a matter of law. Ayco Dev. Corp. v. G.E.T. Serv.
Co., 616 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. 1981).
18. The court also awarded punitive damages in the amount of $500,000, attorneys' fees
of $19,000, and interest in the amount of $266,973. Regarding the operator's claim against
French & Associates, the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment.
19. 709 S.W.2d at 315. See supra note 13 for a list of the four elements of a joint venture.
The appellate court determined that the wells themselves formed a community of interest for
the venture. The court had no difficulty in determining that the parties had agreed to divide
profits in accordance with the interest owned in the wells and bear the expenses in proportion
to the interest owned. 709 S.W.2d at 315.
20. Id.
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him, as either a partner in an existing partnership or a partner with one or
more persons not actual partners, he is liable to the person or persons to
whom the representation is made. 2 1 This theory of liability, known as partnership by estoppel, surfaced in ParamountPetroleum Corp. v. Taylor Rental
Center.22 In Paramount Petroleum Corp., the court held Paramount Petroleum Corporation liable to Taylor Rental Center for invoices pertaining to
Paramount Steamship Company, Ltd., a corporation with whom it shared
the common goal of restoring a ship.
During the restoration, several individuals on separate occasions approached Taylor to rent pumps and sandblasting equipment for use on the
ship. Each time, Taylor would verify the identity and authority of the person making the rental request and, if such were proper, Taylor would release
the equipment. 23
Taylor would then issue an invoice to Paramount
Steamship.
After Taylor failed to receive payment for several invoices pertaining to
rentals made in connection with restoring the ship, it brought an action
against Paramount Petroleum. The trial court entered judgment in favor of
Taylor, and Paramount Petroleum appealed on the grounds that Paramount
Steamship, and not Paramount Petroleum, was the entity liable for the invoices. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding
that both the partnership by estoppel theory24 and the single business enter26
prise theory25 supported the trial court's judgment.
The appellate court analyzed partnership by estoppel as consisting of two
elements: (1) a representation by a person or entity that it is a member of a
partnership and (2) reliance on the representation by someone in extending
credit to the partnership. 27 Evidence that Paramount Petroleum (1) identified itself as "Paramount" in conversations with Taylor, (2) requested that
Taylor send invoices to "Paramount" at a post office box which Paramount
Petroleum shared with Paramount Steamship and (3) permitted Paramount
21. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 16(1) (Vernon 1970).
22. 712 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
23. The first such request was made by a captain who gave Taylor a telephone number to
obtain credit information. When Taylor called the number, a person answered the telephone
saying "Paramount," verified that Paramount had employed the captain, and verified that it
had authorized him to rent equipment on its behalf. The person also told Taylor to send the
invoices to "Paramount" at its Houston post office box. The second rental request was made
by a captain who presented to Taylor his business card, which bore the name "Paramount
Steamship Company."
24. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.

25. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
26. The parties tried the case before the court without a jury, and neither party requested
or filed findings of fact or conclusions of law. Therefore, the trial court's judgment implied all
fact findings necessary to support the judgment. 712 S.W.2d at 536 (citing Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Jefferson Constr. Co., 565 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1978)). The appellate court
added that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed if it could be upheld on any legal
theory supported by the evidence. Id. This loose standard, along with the no evidence test the
court was required to use, made it almost certain that the appellate court would affirm the
judgment of the trial court. Id. Accordingly, the court's language about a single business
enterprise theory carries less precedential value than it might otherwise.
27. Id.
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Steamship to occupy Paramount Petroleum's office space without separately
listing Paramount Steamship as an occupant of that space, indicated to the
court that Paramount Petroleum had represented itself as a member of a
partnership with Paramount Steamship. Additional evidence of Taylor's use
of Paramount Petroleum's telephone number to confirm the authority of the
person renting the equipment and use of Paramount Petroleum's address for
invoices, indicated to the court that Taylor had relied on Paramount Petroleum's representation in extending credit for rentals made in connection
with restoring the ship. The court concluded that this evidence was sufficient to justify holding Paramount Petroleum liable to Taylor under the theory of partnership by estoppel. Independent of the partnership by estoppel
theory, the appellate court analyzed the relationship between Paramount Petroleum and Paramount Steamship under the single business enterprise theory. 2 8 Based on the holdings of two prior Texas courts of civil appeals
cases, 29 the court fabricated the legal principle that "when corporations are
not operated as separate entities but rather integrate their resources to
achieve a common business purpose, each constituent corporation may be
held liable for debts incurred in pursuit of that business purpose."' 30 Factors
that the court listed as important in determining whether constituent corporations have not been maintained as separate entities include: common employees; common offices; centralized accounting; payment of wages by one
corporation to another corporation's employees; common business name;
services rendered on behalf of another corporation; undocumented transfers
31
of funds between corporations; and unclear allocation of profits and losses.
The appellate court concluded that the record contained sufficient evidence
of these factors to justify an implied finding that Paramount Petroleum and
Petroleum Steamship operated as a single business enterprise.
The single business enterprise theory advanced by the Paramount court
provides an additional theory of liability to an aggrieved party who is unable
to prove a cause of action under either a partnership by estoppel theory or a
disregard of the corporate entity theory because of a lack of reliance on the
particular defendant's actions. 32 The holding in Paramountis significant because of its potentially broad applicability to businesses that have common
28. The single business enterprise theory is an equitable principle that Texas courts have
used to justify their results in hard cases. The theory holds that if two or more business enterprises cloak themselves with the appearance of being a single business enterprise, then the
courts should treat them as such. See Allright Texas, Inc. v. Simons, 501 S.W.2d 145, 150
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Murphy Bros. Chevrolet Co. v.
East Oakland Auto. Auction, 437 S.W.2d 272, 275-76 (Tex. Civ.App.-El Paso 1969, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
29. See Allright, 501 S.W.2d at 150; Murphy Bros., 437 S.W.2d at 275-76.
30. 712 S.W.2d at 536. This legal principle is merely a remedy imposed by the court to
cure a perceived injustice arising where a party cannot prove partnership by estoppel, alter ego,
or another similar theory of recovery.
31. 712 S.W.2d at 536.
32. In Paramountthere was no evidence that Taylor had relied at all on the creditworthiness of Paramount Petroleum in extending credit to Paramount Steamship. In fact, the case
discloses no evidence that Taylor even knew of the existence of Paramount Petroleum until
after Paramount Steamship failed to pay its invoices when due.

1987]

CORPORATION AND PAR TNERSHIPS

interests in a single project. For example, a real estate development company which uses several affiliated companies, such as a management company, a construction company, a financing company, etc., with similar
names to carry out the common business purpose of constructing and operating a project is a prime candidate for the application of the Paramount
holding.
D. Rights and Duties of Partners
1. Amendments to Limited PartnershipAgreement. Reilly v. Rangers
Management, Inc. 33 involved the validity of certain amendments to a limited
partnership agreement. Rangers Management, Inc. and CCK, Inc., the general partners in Texas Rangers, Ltd., 34 proposed to amend the limited partnership agreement to change the price for which newly issued partnership
units could be issued and to permit the partnership to issue an unlimited
number of units. 35 Michael Reilly, one of Texas Rangers' seventeen limited
partners, objected to the validity of the proposed amendments, the issuance
of new units and the dilution of his interest. Reilly claimed that the proposed amendments could not be adopted consistent with the provisions of
the limited partnership agreement without the unanimous consent of the
limited partners because the proposed amendments would adversely affect
the general liability of the limited partners and change the manner in which
the partnership allocated profits and losses and distributed partnership funds
36
and assets.
Rangers Management and CCK brought an action to have the proposed
amendments declared adopted and also to have the limited partnership
agreement, as amended, declared in full force and effect. 37 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Ranger management and CCK.
Reilly appealed on the grounds that the proposed amendments required the
unanimous consent of the limited partners under the terms of the limited
partnership agreement.
The court of appeals overruled each of Reilly's grounds of error and af33. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 333 (April 1987).
34. Texas Rangers, Ltd. was a limited partnership created to purchase and operate an
American League baseball franchise known as the Texas Rangers. The initial general partner
was Ranger Management, but later CCK was admitted as a second general partner.
35. Under the limited partnership agreement, no more than 300 partnership units could
ever be issued and the price per unit was set to be no less than $50,000 each.
36. The agreement required the unanimous consent of the limited partners for any amendment that would (1) adversely affect the general liabilities of the limited partners, (2) change

the method of allocation of the profits or losses of the partnership, or (3) change the method of
distribution of the partnership funds or assets. Any other amendments to the agreement required the approval of the holders of a two-thirds percentage interest in the partnership. At
the time the general partners proposed the amendments for adoption, RMI and CCK owned
an 83.78% percentage interest in the partnership. RMI and CCK and five limited partners
voted in favor of the proposed amendments. One limited partner voted against the proposed
amendments. Eleven partners, including Reilly, did not vote.
37. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1 (repealed 1985) now codified at TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.004 (Vernon 1986).
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firmed the district court's judgment.38 Regarding the general liability argument, the court of appeals stated that for an amendment to adversely affect
the general liability of limited partners, the amendment must make a limited
partner liable beyond his partnership contribution. 39 Since the proposed
amendments did not require that the limited partners increase their partnership contributions, they did not adversely affect the general liability of limited partners. 40 Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the
proposed amendments did not adversely affect the general liabilities of the
41
limited partners.
Concerning allocations of profits and losses, Reilly argued that the possibility of an unlimited number of partners who would share in profits and
losses in proportion to their interests changed the very basis of the method of
allocation. The court of appeals acknowledged that Reilly was correct in
recognizing that the more partners there are, the lesser amount each will
receive of the profits, but pointed out that an increase in the number of partners did not change the method of allocation of profits and losses. 42 Instead,
it simply changed the number of people to whom the partnership allocated
profits and losses. 43 Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the
method of allocation of profits and losses would not change as a result of the
proposed amendments.
With respect to the distribution contention, Reilly asserted that the proposed amendments allowed a dilution that would potentially reduce or eliminate the distribution to which a partner was previously entitled, and that this
diminution constituted a change in the "distribution of the partnership funds
or assets."' ' The appellate court acknowledged that the sale of more partnership units would potentially reduce or eliminate the distribution of funds
and assets; however, the court refused to conclude that a change in the
45
method of distribution had occurred.
Reilly's final contention was that TULPA section 10 barred the admission
of additional limited partners absent a provision in the certificate to the contrary; therefore, the law required unanimous consent to adopt the proposed
amendments. 4 6 The court of appeals concluded that the proposed amend38. 717 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ granted).
39. Id. at 447.

40. Id.
41.

Id.

42. Id.
43. Id. at 448. The court gave the following example of a change in the method of allocation: a change in the provision so that the managing general partner received as his share a
different percentage. Another example would be an amendment that gave the general partners
a set amount rather than allocating to them their share in proration to their relative interest in
the partnership.
44. Id.
45. Id. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 10 (Vernon 1970).
46. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 10 (Vernon 1970). In support of the same
contention, Reilly asserted that sections 25(b)(3) and 26(a)(2) of the TULPA required that all

limited partners must sign and swear to an amendment before it can be adopted. The appellate
court acknowledged that while this additional support was an accurate statement of the law,
Reilly and other limited partners assigned the original agreement that contained a power of
attorney giving the general partners the power to sign any validly adopted amendment for the
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ments did not give the general partner the right to admit people as limited
partners. Rather, the proposed amendments merely allowed for the issuance
of more than the previous maximum of 300 units, without specifying who
would buy them.47 Because the proposed amendments did not alter the general partner's authority to admit people as limited partners, the court reasoned that the law did not require unanimous consent to adopt the proposed
48
amendments.
Reilly applied for and received a writ of error from the Texas Supreme
Court.49 Reilly asserted that the limited partnership agreement was at least
ambiguous with respect to the unanimous consent provision and that the
district court, for that reason, was improper in granting summary judgment
against him. The court agreed with Reilly and remanded the case to the
district court for trial on the grounds that the interpretation of the limited
partnership agreement was a question of fact for the jury.50
The supreme court looked at the limited partnership agreement as a whole
in light of the circumstances existing at the time the parties entered the
agreement to determine whether the intention of the parties as evidenced by
the agreement was ambiguous. Pertinent to the court's inquiry was the rule
of construction that "a court should construe contracts from a utilitarian
standpoint bearing in mind the particular business activity sought to be
served and need not embrace strained rules of interpretation which would
avoid ambiguity at all cost." 5 1 Also relevant was the rule that "[c]ourts will
avoid when possible and proper a construction which is unreasonable, ineq'' 52
uitable, and oppressive.
Reading the limited partnership agreement in a light most favorable to
Reilly, the supreme court determined that (1) the limited partnership agreement evidenced the limited partners' intent to protect their limited partnership interests from dilution and (2) a reasonable and utilitarian construction
of the unanimous consent provision was that the parties intended that it
would insure against a nonconsentual dilution of a limited partner's interest. 53 Elimination of such a protection without the unanimous consent of
the limited partners, the court concluded, was potentially oppressive.54 Accordingly, the supreme court held that a fact issue existed as to whether the
amendments required unanimous approval and remanded the case to the
district court for trial. 55 Three justices dissented and would have had the
court affirm the decision of the court of appeals on the grounds that the
limited partners. The general partners therefore did not need the actual signature of each
limited partner on the agreement to validly adopt the proposed amendments. See id. § 33.
47. 717 S.W.2d at 450.

48. Id.
49. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140 (Jan. 14, 1987).

50. Id. at 335-36.
51. Id.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 336.
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limited partnership agreement was clear and unambiguous. 56
Aztec Petroleum Corporationv. MHM Company 57 involved a group of lim-

ited partners who amended their limited partnership agreement to allow replacement of the general partner and conversion of the general partner's
interest to that of a special limited partner pursuant to an explicit amend-

ment power set forth in the limited partnership agreement. 58 The issue
before the court was whether this action by the limited partners violated the
TUPA, the TULPA, contract law, or the partnership agreement.
Aztec Petroleum Corporation was the initial general partner of a limited
partnership. The limited partners became disenchanted with Aztec's performance as general partner and sought to replace Aztec with MHM Company. The limited partnership agreement, however, contained no specific
provision addressing the removal of the general partner. The limited partners attempted to circumvent this problem by proposing an amendment to
the limited partnership agreement that would permit the holders of seventy
percent or more of the partnership units by affirmative vote to convert Aztec
from a general partner to a special limited partner and to replace Aztec with
a new general partner. 59 The limited partners approved the proposed
amendment over the objection of Aztec and then proceeded to convert Aztec

to a special limited partner and install MHM as the new general partner.
Aztec, however, refused to step aside as general partner and filed suit against
MHM. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of MHM, and
Aztec appealed.

In the appellate court Aztec challenged its removal and the substitution of
MHM as general partner on statutory and contractual grounds. Aztec's first
56. Id.
57. 703 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
58. The provision of the partnership agreement regarding amendments permitted the
owners of 10% or more of the limited partnership units to submit a written proposal for the
amendment to the general partner, whereupon the general partner was required to transmit a
verbatim statement of the proposed amendment to the limited partners, accompanied by the
general partner's recommendation for passage or defeat of the amendment. The limited partners would then vote on the amendment and if the owners of 70% or more of the limited
partner units voted in favor of the amendment, the amendment became effective.
59. The critical proposed amendment provided:
6.6 Removal and Replacement of a General Partner. Upon receipt by the
General Partner of written notice of removal from Limited Partners holding
either 70% or more of the Units or 70% or more in interest of the Sharing
Ratios of the Limited Partners (the "Removal Notice"), Aztec Petroleum Corp.
or any successor General Partner to Aztec Petroleum Corp. as General Partner
(the "Removed General Partner") shall be removed as General Partner of the
Partnership. The Removal Notice shall be given to the General Partner as provided for in Section 11.1 of this Agreement. The Limited Partners signing the
Removal Notice shall designate in the Removal Notice a new general partner
(the "Substitute General Partner") to serve as General Partner under this
Agreement. Effective as of 6:00 p.m., Dallas, Texas time, on the day of receipt
of the Removal Notice, which day shall be referred to hereinafter as the "Removal Date," the Partnership interest of the Removed General Partner shall be
converted automatically to a Special Limited Partnership interest as described in
Section 6.7 and the Removed General Partner shall no longer be General Partner and shall have no right or authority to act on behalf of or bind the
Partnership.
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statutory ground was that MHM could not legitimately become a partner
without Aztec's consent because the TUPA precludes a person from becoming a member of a partnership without the consent of all the partners. 6° The
appellate court, however, concluded that since the parties' rights and duties
were set forth in the limited partnership agreement the foregoing part of the
statute was not applicable. 6 1 Relying on prior Texas law, the appellate court
held that in such a situation the limited partnership agreement controls, not
the TUPA, and that courts may look to the TUPA only for guidance. 62
Accordingly, the TUPA did not require that Aztec consent before the limited partners could replace it as a general partner.
Aztec's second statutory ground was that its removal violated the TUPA
and the TULPA because all of the limited partners did not approve of the
removal. 63 Aztec claimed that the statutes require that all limited partners
must consent before a general partner may be removed and replaced. The
court once again disagreed with Aztec's interpretation of the statutes, concluding that the statutes limit only the powers of a generalpartnerto admit
another general partner. 64 The statutes, however, do not limit the powers of
the limited partners when the partnership agreement may be amended by
seventy percent of the limited partnership units and such a majority has
adopted an amendment permitting removal and substitution of a general
partner. 65 Accordingly, the appellate court held that the limited partners'
action in amending the limited partnership agreement and removing Aztec
66
did not violate either the TUPA or the TULPA.
Aztec's first contract law challenge was that its identity as the only general partner was a fundamental element of the limited partnership agreement. Aztec claimed that the parties obviously intended, and basic
principles of contract law dictated, that unanimous consent would be required before a new general partner could be substituted. Although the appellate court agreed with Aztec's assertion as a matter of general contract
law, the limited partnership agreement specifically provided that a less than
60. Id. at 292. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 18(l)(g) (Vernon 1970).
61. 703 S.W.2d at 293.
62. Id. See Park Cities Corp. v. Byrd, 534 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex. 1976). In the present
case the court noted that the limited partnership agreement differed from the TUPA in two
respects. First, the agreement permitted upon the approval of 70% of the partners additional
partners to join the partnership. Second, the agreement permitted amendment of the limited
partnership agreement upon the approval of 70% of the limited partnership units and did not
limit the scope of amendments so as to preclude an amendment calling for the replacement of a
general partner. Based on these differences, the court concluded that the limited partnership
agreement, rather than the TUPA, controlled. 703 S.W.2d at 293.
63. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 10(a) (Vernon 1970), which provides:
A general partner shall have all the rights and powers and be subject to all the
restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited partners,
except that without the written consent or ratification of the specific act by all
the limited partners, a general partner or all of the general partners have no
authority to:
(5) Admit a person as a general partner.
64. 703 S.W.2d at 293.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 295.
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unanimous vote of the limited partners could ratify an amendment to the
limited partnership agreement. Furthermore, the TUPA specifically authorizes such a provision. 67 The limited partnership met any unanimity required by contract law when all the parties to the limited partnership
agreement consented to be bound by any amendments passed by seventy
68
percent of the limited partners.
Aztec's second contract law challenge was that the limited partnership
agreement itself required unanimous consent before replacement of the general partner. Aztec based its contention on provisions of the limited partnership agreement that provided for liquidation of the limited partnership upon
the withdrawal, dissolution, or bankruptcy of the general partner, and also
provided for the powers of the limited partners under those circumstances.
The court rejected Aztec's contention, noting that those sections of the limited partnership agreement did not address the situation of the forcible removal of a general partner. 69 Aztec, in relying on the TULPA, ignored the
fact that the fundamental rights, duties, and obligations of the parties to the
contract were not excepted from the limited partnership agreement amendment provisions. 70 Once Aztec agreed to the contract that included the provision allowing for the seventy percent amendment approval, Aztec could
not then create an exception for what it saw as a fundamental element of the
contract. 71 Consequently, the appellate court ruled that the limited partners' actions in removing and replacing Aztec as general partner did not
72
violate contract law.
Finally, Aztec contended that the removal and replacement by the limited
partners violated the express terms of the limited partnership agreement regarding the restrictions on the limited partners' participation in the management of the limited partnership 73 and that changing the general partner
amounted to interference by the limited partners with the management of
the limited partnership. The appellate court dealt two blows to these contentions. First, the court cited statutory authority which provided that "exercising a right to amend a partnership agreement does not constitute taking
part in the control of the business by the limited partners."'74 Second, the
67. TUPA § 18(a) provides that the rights and duties of partners in relation to the partnership are subject to any agreement between them. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b,
§ 18(a) (Vernon 1970).
68. 703 S.W.2d at 294.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 295.
Aztec relied upon § 7.1 of the limited partnership agreement, which stated:
No Right to Participatein Management. Except as otherwise expressly provided
herein, the Limited Partners shall have no right to, nor shall they, bind the
Partnership or take any part in or interfere with the conduct, control or management of the Partnership's business.
703 S.W.2d at 294.
74. Id.at 295 (discussing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8(b)(5)(B) (Vernon
Supp. 1987)). TULPA § 8(b)(5)(B) provides:
(b) A limited partner does not take part in the control of the business by
virtue of possessing or exercising a power to:
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provision of the limited partnership agreement upon which Aztec relied included the phrase "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided herein."' 75 The
appellate court explained that even if replacing a general partner amounted
to taking part in the control of the business, once the limited partnership
adopted the amendment providing for removal, replacing Aztec fell within
the "except as herein provided" language of the limited partnership agreement. 76 Consequently, the appellate court upheld the limited partners' actions in removing Aztec as general partner.
The Aztec case illustrates the reverence which Texas courts attach to the
seeming sacrosanctity of the partnership agreement. A controlling block of
partners, bridled only by their fiduciary duty among themselves, may add or
delete provisions of the partnership agreement to suit their fancy so long as
they have the requisite number of votes to carry an amendment to the partnership agreement.
2. Joint Venture Management. In RGS, Cardox Recovery, Inc. v.
Dorchester Enhanced Recovery Co. 77 construction of an unusually worded
voting provision in a joint venture agreement enabled the owners of a minority interest to deadlock the management of the joint venture. The provision
read as follows: "No Management Committee meeting may be held or action taken unless voting members representing aggregate venture percentages of at least seventy-five percent (75%) are present and voting, and all
decisions except as otherwise herein provided shall be by majority vote."' 78
At a meeting of the management committee of the joint venture, a vote was
called on the issue of whether RGS should be installed as field operator of
the oil and gas operations of the joint venture rather than Dorchester Enhanced Recovery Company. Dorchester and others owning an aggregate interest in excess of twenty-five percent in the joint venture announced that
with respect to changing operators each was"present, but not voting." RGS
and others, representing, in aggregate, approximately fifty-four percent of
the ownership interest in the venture, voted to remove Dorchster as field
operator of the operations, and to install RGS in the position.
RGS brought a declaratory judgment action seeking either reformation or
interpretation of the joint venture agreement. RGS claimed that the disputed provision required a quorum in order to transact business, and that
after the quorum had been reached, the management committee could con(5) Approve, individually or by a majority of the limited partners (by
number, financial interest, or as otherwise provided in the certificate), material
matters that are stated in the certificate, such as:
(B) Amendment of the partnership certificate or agreement.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8(b)(5)(B) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
75. 703 S.W.2d at 295.
76. Id.The court stated: "We cannot see how proposing, voting on and approving an
amendment to the partnership agreement in the exact method provided within it can violate
the express terms of the partnership agreement." Id.
77. 700 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
78. Id. at 637.
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duct such business as was approved by the owners of a majority of the interests represented. Dorchester moved for summary judgment, urging that the
provision was unambiguous. The trial court granted Dorchester's summary
judgment motion, holding the language unambiguous upon the fact that the
joint venture agreement required at least seventy-five percent of the joint
venture interest be present and voting on each issue before business could be
conducted.
The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision. 79 The court interpreted the first phrase of the voting provision, which clearly controlled when
an action could be taken, as requiring voting members representing at least a
seventy-five percent interest to be both present and voting.80 The court interpreted the second phrase of the voting provision as specifying the percentage
vote necessary to approve any such action. 81 Reading the two provisions
together, the court concluded that the owners of a majority in interest must
vote in favor of an action in order to approve the action, but that the owners
of at least seventy-five percent of the joint venture interest must be present
and voting on such action in order for the vote to be effective. 82 That the
provision might be burdensome or awkward was not a problem for the
courts.8 3 Since the parties agreed to the provision, each
party had the right
84
to rely on compliance with the provision as agreed.
3. Right to an Account. Cornell & Company v. Pace 85 addressed the issue of whether a deceased partner's widow could sue other partners for conversion. Two partnerships, Cornell & Company and Cornell Investment
Company of Amarillo, consisted of the same six certified public accountants. 86 James C. Pace was a partner in both partnerships until August 31,
1981, when he withdrew from the partnerships to start another accounting
firm comprised of unrelated persons. In October 1981, Pace committed
suicide.
The partnerships in which Pace was a partner were continuing businesses
involving a multitude of transactions and a complexity of accounts. A detailed accounting was necessary to adjust the partners' accounts and a formal accounting was necessary to determine each partner's interest. Pace's
widow, acting individually and as independent executrix of Pace's estate,
sued for an accounting to recover the unpaid value of Pace's interests in the
partnerships. She also alleged that partners and the partnerships had converted the value of Pace's interests in the partnerships since the partners and
the partnerships had failed to provide her with Pace's share of the partnerships' assets. This allegation was apparently in recognition of the complex
79. Id. at 640.
80. Id. at 638-39.
81. Id. at 639.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 703 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
86. Cornell & Company was a CPA partnership and Cornell Investment Company was a
partnership formed to own and lease real property.
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accounts of the partnerships and in response to difficulty in reaching an
agreeable accounting. The trial court entered judgment for Pace's widow,
and the partners appealed. The case presented the classical situation of a
partner, his personal representative, or his surviving spouse being barred
from suing another partner for conversion until an accounting has been completed. Until the completion of the accounting, the only remedy available to
such a person is a suit for an accounting. 87 The general rule that an accounting is a condition precedent to an action based on partnership claims to ascertain the amounts recoverable dictates this result. 88 Hence, Pace's widow
could not commence an action for conversion for money represented by a
general debt from the partnerships until such time as the suit for an accounting had been completed.
E. Dissolution
Thomas v. American National Bank 89 addressed the issue of whether a
joint venture known as Southwestern Cinema had dissolved prior to refinancing a $360,000 loan it had entered into with American National Bank
("American"), thereby excusing two former members of the joint venture
from liability for the repayment of the loan. Charles F. Thomas, B.J. McCombs, and the PGR Investment Company formed Southwestern Cinema to
purchase and distribute two motion pictures. Each venturer owned onethird of Southwestern Cinema and PGR was the managing venturer. PGR
was a partnership that consisted of Celso Gonzalez and three other individuals. Gonzalez was the managing partner of PGR. Gonzalez, under the express authority of the Southwestern Cinema joint venture agreement, could
finance the venture by borrowing up to a maximum of $500,000. In 1981,
Southwestern Cinema obtained a loan of $360,000 from Parkdale State
Bank.
Thomas, McCombs, and PGR were all partners in Southwestern Cinema
at the time of the loan transaction and acknowledged that they were individually liable as such for the Parkdale indebtedness. Shortly thereafter,
Thomas and McCombs became disenchanted with their involvement in the
venture because of their inability to obtain information from Gonzalez with
regard to their interests. In the early part of 1982, Thomas told Gonzalez
that he and McCombs wanted out of Southwestern Cinema. The three of
them subsequently agreed that Thomas and McCombs would assign their
interests in Southwestern Cinema to Gonzalez in his individual capacity.
In May 1982, and on behalf of Southwestern Cinema, Gonzalez negotiated a new loan with American and paid off the Parkdale indebtedness with
the proceeds. Southwestern Cinema, however, failed to repay the American
loan when it came due. As a result, American demanded payment from the
partners of Southwestern Cinema individually. American then brought an
action against Southwestern Cinema and its partners to collect on the loan.
87. 703 S.W.2d at 403.
88. Id.
89. 704 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. 1986).
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The trial court granted American's motion for summary judgment against
Southwestern Cinema, Thomas, McCombs, PGR and the partners of PGR,
jointly and severally. The court based this finding on the fact that Southwestern Cinema had not dissolved prior to the time of the loan from American. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court judgment, holding Thomas
and McCombs liable on the note to American because they had not effectively withdrawn from Southwestern Cinema. 90 Thomas and McCombs petitioned the Texas Supreme Court for, and received, a writ of error.
The key issue addressed by the supreme court involved whether withdrawal from the partnership by a number of partners sufficient to dissolve
the partnership contractually, coupled with an assignment of their interests
to a remaining partner, was sufficient to dissolve the partnership. American
strongly urged that the partnership in this case was not dissolved because the
assignment of the partnership interests by Thomas and McCombs to Gonzalez did not of itself dissolve the partnership. 9 1 The supreme court, however,
focused on the dissolution provisions of the TUPA, 92 rather than the assignment provisions and concluded that the withdrawal by Thomas and McCombs from the partnership caused a change in the relation of the partners
93
since they ceased to be associated in the carrying on of the business.
Therefore, the partnership dissolved as of the date of withdrawal. 94 Furthermore, even if the remaining partners had elected to continue the partnership,
the entity would still have dissolved as to the partners who withdrew from
the business. 95 Relying on decisions in other states that have applied this
rule in the context of a simultaneous dissolution and transfer of interest, the
court concluded the express will of the outgoing partner to dissolve the part96
nership controls.
The supreme court also addressed the issue of what constituted sufficient
notice of a partner's desire to withdraw from a partnership. The court held
that there is no requirement that notice of dissolution, a matter relating to
partnership affairs, be communicated to each member of a joint venture
since "notice to any partner of any matter relating to partnership affairs...
operates as notice to or knowledge of the partnership."'97 Relying on an
early Texas Supreme Court case that held it not necessary to have a distinct
agreement between all the members regarding the precise time of a dissolution, 98 the court determined that any of the partners in the firm could have
dissolved the partnership in any manner. 99 The court noted that its conclusion was in accordance with decisions of other states that the giving of notice
90. 694 S.W.2d 543, 551 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985), rev'd, 704 S.W.2d 321 (Tex.

1986).
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 27(1) (Vernon 1970).
Id. §§ 29, 31.
704 S.W.2d at 323.
Id. at 323-24.
Id.

96. Id. at 324.

97. Id. (quoting TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 12 (Vernon 1970)).
98. See Green v. Waco State Bank, 74 Tex. 2, 14 S.W. 252 (1890).
99. 704 S.W.2d at 324.
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to other partners accomplished dissolution and that no particular form of
notice is required. 1 °
An alternative ground upon which the supreme court could have based its
holding is section 35 of the TUPA, which limits the power of a partner to
bind a partnership after dissolution to (1) acts appropriate for winding up
partnership affairs or completing transactions unfinished at dissolution and
(2) acts with persons who were creditors of the partnership at or prior to
dissolution, or persons who had knowledge of the partnership, who were not
on notice that a dissolution had taken place.101
F. ProceduralMatters
1. Jurisdiction. Colwell Realty Investments, Inc. v. Triple T Inns of Arizona, Inc. 102 discussed the issue of whether sufficient contacts existed between the general partner of an Arizona limited partnership and the State of
Texas to warrant Texas' exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Arizona
limited partnership in a contract action brought by a Texas corporation.
The only contacts the general partner had with Texas were that (1) it consented to the substitution of the Texas corporation as a limited partner in
place of a California corporation, (2) it engaged in partnership activities that
it knew would require the consent of the Texas limited partner, and (3) it
caused foreseeable injuries to the Texas limited partner by proceeding with
its activities without receiving consent from the Texas limited partner. In
affirming the trial court's dismissal of a suit against the general partner for
lack of personal jurisdiction, the appellate court held that a nonresident cannot be held subject to a forum's jurisdiction merely by contracting with a
resident of that forum. 10 3 Similarly, acts performed outside of the forum
which were in breach of the contract were irrelevant to the issue of personal
jurisdiction. The appellate court added that a forum does not have jurisdiction over a nonresident general partner merely because the forum is the limited partner's state of incorporation. 104 The appellate court examined such
factors as "prior negotiations, contemplated future consequences, terms of
the contract, and the parties' actual course of dealing" 10 5 to determine
whether the general partner's consent to the substitution purposefully established minimum contacts in Texas sufficient to subject it to jurisdiction in
Texas, and concluded that it did not.10 6
100. Id. See, e.g., Webster & Co. v. Nestle, 669 P.2d 1046 (Colo. App. 1983) (withdrawal
of a partner); Babray v. Carlino, 2 Ill.
App. 3d 241, 276 N.E.2d 436 (1971) (verbal agreement
to dissolve); Cave v. Cave, 81 N.M. 797, 474 P.2d 480 (1970) (mutual consent to dissolve
evidenced by acts); Nicholes v. Hunt, 273 Or. 255, 541 P.2d 820 (1975) (telephone call advis-

ing partner that business relationship was at an end was sufficient at dissolution); Timmermann v. Timmermann, 272 Or. 613, 538 P.2d 1254 (1975) (oral notice).
101. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, sec. 35.
102. 785 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1986).
103. Id. at 1334.

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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Texas Commerce Bank N.A. v. Interpol '80 Limited Partnership10 7 involved the issue of whether a Colorado limited partnership that had contracted with a Colorado corporation to purchase and exploit Texas natural
resources was subject to the jurisdiction of the State of Texas in a contract
action brought by a Texas banking association, which was the assignee of
accounts receivable of the Colorado corporation. The court concluded that
the contract from which the suit arose, a partially performed contract for the
limited partnership to purchase and exploit Texas oil and gas interests, was
sufficient to satisfy the requirement that a nexus must exist between the
cause of action and the limited partnership's contacts with Texas.108 Furthermore, the limited partnership had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas by entering into the contract
concerning Texas oil and gas interests, 1°9 by reserving in the contract the
rights to maintain its own representatives at the well site, and by agreeing
that Texas law would govern any disputes arising out of the contract. 110
Therefore, the court held that the Colorado corporation was subject to the
jurisdiction of Texas courts.
II.

CORPORATION LAW DEVELOPMENTS

A. Piercing the Corporate Veil
The Texas Supreme Court in Castleberry v. Branscum 111 held by a narrow
five-to-four majority that constructive fraud by the shareholders of a closely
held corporation, in liquidating the corporation without paying the corporation's notes to a redeemed shareholder, constituted inequitable treatment
sufficient to justify piercing the corporate veil.' 12 Accordingly, the court
imposed personal liability for the payment of the notes on the shareholders. 113 The Castleberry case is important because it substantially broadens
the grounds for piercing the corporate veil in a contract case.
Castleberryinvolved a furniture moving business started in 1980 by Joe A.
Castleberry, Byron Branscum and Michael G. Byboth. Castleberry, Branscum, and Byboth later incorporated the business as Texan Transfers, Inc.
Shortly after the incorporation of Texan Transfers, Branscum formed a competing business, Elite Moving. Castleberry did not approve of Elite Moving
competing with Texan Transfers and became disenchanted with his business
relationship with Branscum. In order to relieve the tension between the parties, Texan Transfers redeemed Castleberry's stock in exchange for a $42,000
unsecured promissory note from the corporation. Neither Branscum nor
Byboth personally guaranteed the payment of the note.
After the redemption, Branscum and Byboth permitted Elite Moving to
107.

703 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).

108. Id.at 771.
109. Id.at 773.
110. Id.
111.

721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986).

112. Id. at 275.
113. Id.
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take over increasing amounts of Texan Transfers' business. Branscum and
Byboth also permitted Texan Transfers to loan Elite Moving its trucks and
employees without written rental agreements or other records to show how
much Elite Moving owed Texan Transfers for the use of the trucks and employees. 114 Over time, Texan Transfers' business declined dramatically and
Elite Moving's business operated at a relatively successful level.
Texan Transfers paid the first installment ($1,000) on the note to Castleberry, but defaulted on the remaining $41,000. Shortly thereafter, Castleberry sued Texan Transfers, Branscum, and Byboth to recover on the note.
Castleberry's lawsuit prompted Byboth and Branscum to terminate Texan
Transfers' contract with its most important customer, Freed Furniture, and
to start another furniture moving company, Custom Carriers, Inc. Branscum and Byboth negotiated Custom Carriers a contract with Freed Furniture to make the same deliveries as Texan Transfers formerly handled and at
the same rate. After the termination of the Freed Furniture contract, Texan
Transfers no longer had a significant amount of business. This prompted
Branscum and Byboth to liquidate it, selling all of its trucks to individuals
who later became independent contractors for Custom Carriers. Branscum
and Byboth paid themselves "back salaries" with the proceeds of the
liquidation.
In Castleberry's complaint he alleged personal liability against Branscum
and Byboth on the note under an alter ego theory. 115 The trial court instructed the jury that Texan Transfers could become the alter ego of Branscum and Byboth if they used the corporation as a sham to perpetrate a fraud
or if they failed to follow one or more corporate formalities. The instruction
defined fraud not as actual fraud, which requires an intent to deceive, but as
constructive fraud-"an act, omission or concealment that involves a breach
of a legal duty, trust or confidence justly reposed and that is injurious to
another person, or by which an undue or unconscionable advantage is
taken." 1 16 The trial court rendered judgment against Texan Transfers based
on a jury finding that Branscum and Byboth used Texan Transfers as a sham
to perpetrate a fraud, and disregarded the corporate fiction to hold Branscum and Byboth individually liable on the note. 117 The appellate court reversed, holding that no evidence supported the jury's findings; that the
instruction submitted to the jury was defective; and that the issues should
not have been submitted to the jury because a disregard of the corporate
fiction is solely a question of law.118 In November 1985, the Texas Supreme
Court, in a per curiam decision, initially denied Castleberry's application for
writ of error, but the court later reversed itself on Castleberry's motion for
114. Additionally, Branscum and Byboth declined to advertise on behalf of Texan Transfers in any manner, but permitted Elite Moving to advertise.
115. Some evidence indicated that Branscum and Byboth failed to follow some corporate
formalities.
116. 721 S.W.2d at 276.
117. Id.at 271.
118. Id.
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rehearing on the denial of the writ.1 19 A sharply divided supreme court then
proceeded to reverse the appellate court's judgment and affirm the trial
court's decision, holding that (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the
jury's findings, (2) although the submitted jury charge was defective, the
defendants waived all objections, and (3) disregarding the corporate fiction is
a fact question for the jury. 120
The court's opinion is unclear with respect to the nature and extent of its
holding. 12 1 As a result, at least three possible readings of the supreme
court's opinion are plausible: (1) that a showing of constructive fraud is
sufficient to pierce the corporate veil in-a contract case; (2) that a showing of
mere unfair or inequitable treatment is sufficient to justify the imposition of
an equitable remedy; or (3) that the court simply accepted the test used in
the trial court because no proper objection was raised to it. One thing that is
clear, however, from the supreme court's opinion is that equitable considerations play a major role in the determination of whether a court will disregard
the corporate existence.
The dissenting opinion in Castleberry is far from timid in its challenges to
the soundness of the majority opinion, attacking it as making "hypertechnical" arguments and stretching the imagination in uncovering a method to
support a jury finding in the face of an admittedly defective jury charge. 122
Whether Castleberry had suffered an actionable wrong, however, was not a
point of contest between the justices. The issue, rather, was whether Castleberry had jumped through the proper hoops in his quest for a recovery. The
majority based its opinion on the theory that constructive fraud is a sufficient
ground to disregard the corporate entity and to support a recovery from the
perpetrators of the constructive fraud. 23 The dissent, however, would require a complaining party to establish facts that parallel a more pigeon holed
pleading requirement in order to recover. 124
The importance of the supreme court's opinion is twofold. First, the opinion substantially broadens the grounds upon which a court may disregard
corporate existence in a contract case. Second, it retreats from the court's
previously stringent standard announced last survey period in Lucas v.
119. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 123 (Jan. 11, 1986).
120. 721 S.W.2d at 275-77.
121. Much of the ambiguity results from the fact that Castleberry's theories of liability and
the jury instructions did not align themselves well with the facts of the case.
122. 721 S.W.2d at 280-81 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
123. As stated by the court:
[T]he purpose in disregarding the corporation fiction "is to prevent use of the

corporate entity as a cloak for fraud or illegality or to work an injustice, and
that purpose should not be thwarted by adherence to any particular theory of

liability"... "When this [disregarding the corporate fiction] should be done is
a question of fact and common sense. ..
Id. at 273 (quoting).
124. The dissenting opinion conceded that the facts of the case probably supported a cause

of action for recovery under such theories as denuding of corporate assets or constructive trust.
The dissent, however, was adamant in its conclusion that the facts failed to support the actual
theory of law pleaded by Castleberry, that of alter ego, and that Castleberry never even
pleaded sham to perpetuate a fraud, the theory upon which he ultimately recovered. Id. at
280.
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Texas Industries, Inc. 125 In Lucas the court held that in a contract case the
plaintiff who seeks to disregard the corporate entity must show some deception or fraud in order to prevail.' 26 The Castleberry decision effectively dilutes Lucas by holding that a mere showing of constructive fraud, which
exists whenever inequity or unfairness is at hand, is sufficient to justify piercing the corporate veil and imposing personal liability on the shareholders
who perpetrate the constructive fraud. 127
Similarly, the supreme court has shown a reluctance to hang an aggrieved
party on his pleadings in a disregard of the corporate entity case. As is
evident from the majority opinion, all bases for ignoring the corporate existence could well become fungible if the court is willing to construe pleadings
in a fashion most likely to bring the ultimate question of liability to the jury.
The court's emphasis on equitable considerations coupled with its eagerness
to bring the question of liability before the jury indicates that much of the
regiment of theories for disregarding the corporate existence can hereafter be
grouped under a single heading: constructive fraud. 128
On a practical level it appears that since the question of piercing the corporate veil is now firmly entrenched as a question of fact, proper jury issues
and instructions are of primary importance to practitioners and lower
courts. In this regard, both Castleberry and Lucas provide insightful reading. The residual messages of Castleberry from a practitioner's standpoint
are that the plaintiff in a piercing the corporate veil case will now have an
easier time surviving a motion for summary judgment on the issue of shareholder liability and that a defendant must recognize the importance of making a proper objection to an improper jury charge on that issue. Castleberry
stands for the proposition that a plaintiff in a piercing the corporate veil case
should separately and specifically plead each basis for disregarding the corporate entity in order to ensure that the jury has the opportunity to consider
each such issue.
Rose v. IntercontinentalBank, NA.,129 a pre-Castleberry Texas court of
appeals decision, held that a showing of bad faith is sufficient to overcome
the deception or fraud standard for piercing the corporate veil in a contract
case.' 30 Ebb Rose was an officer and shareholder of two corporations: a
corporation in the business of selling automobiles and a corporation in the
business of leasing automobiles.' 3' Steve King was a personal assistant to
125. 696 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. 1984).
126. Id. at 374.
127. The dissenting opinion Would retain the distinction between the standard applied in a
contract case and a tort case. Additionally, the dissenting opinion supported the defendant's
point of error regarding a defective jury charge.
128. It is interesting that the Texas Supreme Court, which in English v. Fischer, 660
S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1983), strongly expounded the maxim that Texas imposed no general duty of
good faith on parties to a contract, has now bent over backwards to rescue a party that has
been treated inequitably under a contract. It is evident that the court in Castleberry has engaged in double-speak or has not considered the logical extension of its holding.
129. 705 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
130. Id. at 754.
131. His wife, son and two daughters owned the remaining shares.
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Rose and managed the corporations. The sales corporation and the leasing
corporation maintained checking accounts at Intercontinental Bank and
Jetero Bank, respectively. King was the only person authorized to write
checks on the corporate accounts.
In 1977 Rose sold all of the assets of the sales corporation to a third-party
purchaser. 132 King stayed on with Rose after the sale, continuing to operate
the leasing corporation while winding up the affairs of the sales corporation.
During the winding-up period, King issued several checks at Rose's request,
making the checks out to Rose or to "Cash." King also wrote several checks
payable to himself. The evidence showed that King wrote checks on both
accounts to make payments on lease cars used by Rose, his family members,
and friends. Rose made a $10,000 down payment on his yacht with proceeds
from the sales corporation's account, and Rose's daughter used cash from
this account to repay a $75,000 loan from the sales corporation. These withdrawals were made from the account despite the fact that the assets of the
sales corporation had been sold and its affairs were being wound up. There
was also testimony that Rose authorized advances to King in excess of
$100,000 out of the sales corporation's account.
In December 1979, Intercontinental Bank discovered that King's check
writing activities had created an overdraft of $283,331.15 in the sales corporation's account. Checks written on uncollected funds accounted for the
overdraft. To cover negative balances, King had written checks back and
forth between the leasing corporation's account at Jetero Bank and the sales
corporation's account at Intercontinental Bank. On December 27, 1979,
Jetero Bank, after discovering the overdrafts, froze the leasing corporation's
account and thereby caused the overdraft of the sales corporation's account
at Intercontinental Bank.
Intercontinental Bank brought an action against Rose, seeking to recover
for the overdraft, alleging (1) that Rose was the sales corporation's alter ego,
(2) that the sales corporation possessed insufficient assets to cover its transactions, and (3) that Rose used the checking accounts of the two corporations to perpetrate a fraud. In support of its contention Intercontinental
Bank relied on a court of appeals decision which held that a sole shareholder
guilty of grossly unfair manipulation of the corporate enterprise in his individual interest cannot be allowed to interpose the separate identity of the
corporation to insulate himself from personal liability.' 3 3 The trial court
entered judgment against Rose based on a jury finding that he was the alter
ego of the sales corporation. Rose appealed the trial court's judgment on the
grounds that there was either no evidence or insufficient evidence to support
the jury's finding on the theory of alter ego and that the trial court erred in
submitting an alter ego charge to the jury.
132. The evidence indicated that the sales corporation was experiencing financial difficulties at the time of the sale and that corporate assets had to be sold and money had to be
injected into the corporation by Rose's daughter to consummate the sale.
133. See Tigrett v. Pointer, 580 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd

n.r.e.).
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In support of Rose's contentions on appeal, he asserted that in a contract
alter ego case the law as set forth in Lucas134 and Torregrossa v. Szelc 13 5
requires the complaining party to show that the individual used the corporation as a vehicle to perpetrate a fraud. Furthermore, Rose relied on the facts
that he was not active in the management of the sales corporation, that he
was not authorized to write checks on the corporate accounts, and that he
put more money into the sales corporation than he took out, in an effort to
show that he did not personally use the corporations to perpetrate a fraud.
The appellate court overruled Rose's no evidence point, relying on the evidence mentioned above and also the additional evidence that on each occasion the sales corporation's account became overdrawn Rose agreed to
personally inject funds into the account and that, absent the suspicious withdrawals, the sales corporation could have successfully wound up its
business. 136
The appellate court disposed of Rose's insufficiency contention in two
parts. First, it rejected Rose's legal theory that fraud was the only basis for
submitting the alter ego theory to a jury in a contract action by holding that
a showing of mere bad faith is sufficient. 137 The appellate court viewed the
use or misuse that a shareholder makes of the corporate form as determinative of whether the shareholder will be insulated from personal liability and
set forth the rule that "[flailure to distinguish between corporate property
and personal property and use of corporate funds to pay personal expenses
without proper accounting is a basis for submitting the issue of alter ego" to
the jury.

138

Second, the appellate court concluded that the affirmative evidence put
forth by Rose was insufficient to dislodge the jury finding where the record
showed that Rose knew that Intercontinental Bank relied upon his assurances and credit and that Rose was aware that, should King borrow funds
from the sales corporation, Rose would be required to sign a personal guaranty. 139 The appellate court held that the fact Rose was not actively involved in the day-to-day management of the sales corporation was not
dispositive of the issue and concluded that such a fact did not contradict a
finding of alter ego. 14 The appellate court additionally noted that when
Rose, as an officer, manipulated the sales corporation's account during the
winding up of its affairs, Rose breached a fiduciary duty:
[w]inding up the affairs of an insolvent corporation is an exceptional
situation. In this situation, a jury could find that manipulation of the
corporate bank account by an officer of the corporation justifies piercing
the corporate veil.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

696 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. 1984).
603 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. 1980).
705 S.W.2d at 754.
Id. at 755.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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..We hold that facts that show that an exceptional circumstance existed between a creditor and a majority stockholder of a corporation,
and that also show a lack of good faith dealings by that majority shareholder with that creditor, provide a sufficient basis to pierce the corporate veil. 141
Rose also challenged the form and substance of the trial court's alter ego
charge to the jury on the grounds that it was a global submission containing
surplusage and an improper definition. 142 In order to prevail Rose had to
object properly to the charge and show that the variance between the pleadings and the evidence offered at trial was substantial, misleading, constituted
surprise, and was prejudicial. 143 The appellate court, however, rejected
Rose's challenge on the grounds that (1) his objection failed to point out
which portions of the proof constituted the variance alleged,'I" and (2) there
14
was in fact no such variance as was alleged.
Wheat v. Delcourt146 involved a suit for breach of a contract to build a
townhouse in which the buyer sought to pierce the corporate veil of the
seller's successor to recover damages. On February 7, 1978, Delcourt, the
buyer, signed an earnest money contract with Custom Contemporaries, Inc.
("CCI"), whereby CCI agreed to construct a townhouse for Delcourt for
$90,000. Wheat acquired title to the property on May 3, 1979, by foreclosing on a deed of trust lien securing a personal note given to Wheat by CCI's
president David Carl. The next day, Wheat transferred the property to
Pacemaker Homes, Inc., a corporation of which he was director, treasurer,
and the sole shareholder, in exchange for a $121,000 promissory note.
On June 4, 1979, Wheat sent Delcourt a letter informing him that Pacemaker Homes had taken over the completion of the townhouse for the price
of $95,000 plus extras in the amount of $4,000. The letter stated that Pacemaker Homes would proceed with the construction and requested confirma141. Id. at 755-56.
142. The court instructed the jury as follows:
You are instructed that among the factors to be considered in determining if a
corporation is the alter ego of an individual are whether the affairs of the corporation are indistinguishable from the individual's personal affairs and whether
the individual acted in such a manner as to lead others to reasonably believe that
the corporation had reference to the individual. In order to be the alter ego of
an individual, the corporation must be used by the individual as an unfair device
to achieve an inequitable result or as a sham to perpetrate a fraud, or to avoid a
personal liability.
Id. at 756 (emphasis by the court).
143. Id. at 755; see Scott v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 572 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1978).
144. Rose's objection to the charge was as follows:
The submission of these issues in the global form that they are being submitted is in a violation of Scott vs. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad in that
the Plaintiff has pled certain factors that he considered to be alter egos in his
Pleadings. Some of these we have had evidence on; some have not .... On that
basis, Your Honor, it would be impossible for the court on that basis if the jury
made a finding on Issue No. 1 and Issue No. 2.
705 S.W.2d at 755.

145. Id.
146. 708 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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tion of the earlier agreed purchase price.' 47 The letter also asked Delcourt
for evidence of his financing arrangements for the sale.
On October 11, 1979, Wheat sent Delcourt another letter, this time terminating the contract because Delcourt had failed to furnish evidence of his
financing arrangements and Wheat could not construct the townhouse for
the agreed purchase price. In November 1979, Sundero Construction Company, owned by Wheat's father, acquired the property by foreclosing on a
first deed of trust lien. The lien secured a note given by CCI to Pennamco,
Inc. Sundero subsequently purchased this note.
Delcourt sued Wheat and filed a lis pendens on the property. In February
of 1980, however, Sundero sold the property to Emma Shields for $125,000.
Delcourt then sued Wheat, Pacemaker Homes, CCI, Sundero and Shields
for breach of contract. At trial, Delcourt waived his plea for specific performance and sought damages from the corporate defendants and Wheat,
individually, under a theory of alter ego.
In its answers to special issues the jury found that (1) Delcourt entered
into a contract with CCI to buy the townhouse, (2) Pacemaker Homes,
through Wheat, assumed CCI's obligations under the contract and ultimately breached the contract and (3) Pacemaker Homes was Wheat's alter
ego. The jury awarded Delcourt $36,500 in damages and the trial court
entered judgment on the verdict. Wheat appealed.
The court of appeals found that the evidence was sufficient to support the
jury's finding of alter ego.' 48 First, Wheat was the director, president, treasurer, and sole shareholder of Pacemaker Homes, Inc. Second, the sole meeting of the directors and shareholders was held on the day he formed the
corporation. All subsequent corporate action and shareholder action was
done by unanimous consent. 149 Third, Wheat testified that he did not know
who was the secretary or treasurer or how many directors there were and
that he could not identify the directors. Fourth, the court noted that the
evidence of Pacemaker Homes' capitalization was conflicting.' 50 Wheat
claimed that Pacemaker held the title to a substantial amount of land and
improvements; the record, however, showed that Wheat, acting through
Pacemaker Homes, was unable to finish the townhouses due to lack of funds.
Pacemaker was also unable to borrow the capital necessary to finish the
homes.
Other factors notwithstanding, the most compelling evidence of alter ego
was the transfer of the property to Pacemaker Homes and the later acquisition of that property by Sundero. Wheat, as an individual, had loaned
David Carl money to complete the property. In exchange for the loan,
Wheat received a note from Carl secured by a deed of trust lien on the property. Just one day later Wheat deeded the property to his corporation, Pace147. After Delcourt received the letter he continued to work with Wheat's homebuilder
concerning details of the construction.
148. 708 S.W.2d at 900.

149. In his answers to interrogatories, Wheat stated that no shareholder meetings were
held.
150. 708 S.W.2d at 900.
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maker Homes, in exchange for a note for $122,235.30. In August of 1979,
four months later, Wheat's father formed Sundero Construction Company
for the purpose of buying the outstanding first lien on the property and foreclosing on the lien. This action cut off any possible claims still outstanding
against CCI that had been assumed by Pacemaker Homes. Wheat's father
testified that, with all such claims cleared, Wheat, through Pacemaker
Homes, would be able to borrow the money to complete the property. Sundero purchased the first lien and foreclosed on it, acquiring the property. At
that time, Wheat pretended to transfer $121,000 to Sundero, Sundero pretended to transfer the sum back to Pacemaker, and Pacemaker pretended to
transfer it to Wheat. This mere "bookkeeping transaction," as described by
Wheat, transferred all outstanding obligations to Wheat.
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of alter ego, stating that "the rapid time frame in which these transactions occurred provided evidence to the jury that [Wheat] was attempting to
avoid an existing legal obligation."1'51 The court, in further support of its
holding, noted that Sundero's sale of the property to Emma Shields was conditioned upon the closing taking place only through a title company owned
by Wheat's father. 152 Sundero made the sale under this condition, despite
Wheat's and his father's knowledge that Delcourt had filed a lis pendens
against the property. Finally, the court concluded that when an individual
to evade an existing legal obligation, a finding
attempts to use a corporation
153
of alter ego is justified.
Great American Homebuilders, Inc. v. Gerhart154 involved the imposition
of personal liability upon the president of a sham corporation under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)155 for misrepresentations made on behalf of the corporation by the president to a third party. Although the
appellate court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial
court's finding that the corporation was a sham,1 56 the court also held that
the president was personally liable for his misrepresentations to the third
57
party even though he performed the acts as an agent for the corporation.1
Furthermore, since the third party's cause of action was under the DTPA,
no proof of fraud, trickery, artifice, or device was required.15 8 The statute
deems the misrepresentation itself a deceptive act.159 If taken literally, this
case means that an agent of a corporation exposes himself to personal liability for all damages caused by an incorrect factual statement to a consumer,
regardless of the agent's intent, and the agent's principal is also liable if the
agent was acting within the scope of his duties.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id.
708 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

155.

TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1987).

156. 708 S.W.2d at 8.
157. Id. at 11.

158. Id.
159. Id.
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In Aztec Management & Investment Co. v. McKenzie 160 homeowners sued
Aztec and its president, Johnson, for Aztec's breach of its contractual duty
to furnish water to residential lots. The trial court rendered judgment
against Aztec and against Johnson personally under an alter ego theory. On
appeal, the homeowners
argued that Johnson's own statements regarding
"my water service" 161 and similar statements constituted judicial admissions
that Aztec was Johnson's alter ego. The appellate court, however, held that
Johnson's statements were not sufficiently deliberate, clear, or unequivocal
to constitute judicial admissions of alter ego status. Furthermore, the appellate court held that even if Johnson had stated that he believed he was personally liable for the corporation's debts, that statement would not amount
162
to a judicial admission that the corporation was his alter ego.
The appellate court went on to state that the corporate fiction will be ignored only under "compelling circumstances" and then set forth the applicable tests for determining whether particular circumstances are sufficiently
compelling. 163 The "blending" theory, which was previously rejected in Lucas 164 and subsequently modified in Castleberry,165 generally would suffice
to impose personal liability on a shareholder even absent a showing of fraud
or constructive fraud. 16 6 Similarly, the court stated that the "corporate formality" theory, the "inadequate formality" theory and the "inadequate capitalization" theory would suffice. 167 Nonetheless, the court reversed the trial
court's decision, holding that there was no evidence concerning blending of
the corporate and individual identities.1 68 The court noted that merely because one individual owned all of the stock of the company does not of itself
make the corporation that individual's alter ego. 16 9 Furthermore, merely
showing that the corporation lost money does not in itself prove
undercapitalization. 170
O'Berry v. McDermott, Inc.171 involved an attempt by a tort victim to obtain service of process against a parent corporation by serving a subsidiary
corporation based on the theory that the subsidiary was the alter ego of the
parent. Fluor Ocean Services, Inc., a subcontractor of McDermott International, Inc., employed O'Berry as an oil worker. McDermott International
was the contractor for Union Oil Company of Thailand and was constructing a platform in the Gulf of Thailand. O'Berry sustained a work-related
injury and sued McDermott International, Fluor, Union Oil Company of
160. 709 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
161. Id. at 238.

162. Id.
163. Id. at 239.
164. 696 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. 1984).

165. 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986); see supra notes 111-128 & accompanying text.
166. 709 S.W.2d at 239. It is apparent from the text of the opinion that the appellate court
did not have access to the Lucas case. Furthermore, it should be noted that the instant case
preceded the Castleberry case.
167. Id.
168. Id.

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 712 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Thailand, and Union Oil Company of California in Harris County, Texas.
O'Berry attempted service of process on Union Oil Company of Thailand by
serving Union Oil Company of California, on the theory that Union Oil of
Thailand was the alter ego of Union Oil of California. The trial court sustained Union Oil Company of Thailand's special appearance and quashed
service of process against it. On appeal, the sole question was whether such
an alter ego relationship existed.
The court, citing Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp.,172 listed fourteen factors
that O'Berry claimed raised a fact issue as to whether the two companies had
an alter ego relationship. 173 The court held, however, that even where these
1 74
factors do exist they do not rise to the level of any evidence of alter ego.
Reiterating the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Lucas, the appellate court
stated that, in a tort case where the issue of alter ego is to be determined, the
test is whether "the corporation responsible for the plaintiff's injury is capable of paying a judgment upon proof of liability."1 75 It is only where a court
determines that a corporation is undercapitalized in light of the nature and
risk of its business that the court should consider piercing the corporate veil
1 76
in a tort case.
The court applied the Lucas test to the facts at hand and concluded that
the factors listed could not have induced O'Berry to fall victim to a basically
unfair device by which Union Oil Company of Thailand's corporate entity
was used to achieve an inequitable result. 177 Accordingly, the court affirmed
the trial court's grant8 of a summary judgment in favor of Union Oil Company of California.17
United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas, Inc. 17 9 concerned an attempt by
shareholders to pierce the veil of their own corporation. Bruce Griffin and
his wife were the sole shareholders of a corporation. The federal government attempted forfeiture of a ranch and various items of personal property
which were held in the name of the corporation on the grounds that they
had been purchased with monies earned from illegal narcotics transactions.
172. 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1975).
173. The factors were:
1) the parent caused the incorporation of the subsidiary; 2) the parent owned
most of the stock of the subsidiary; 3) the compromise had common or overlapping directors and officers; 4) the parent or another subsidiary provided financial
records services to the subsidiary; 5) the companies used the same corporate
officers; 6) the parent and the subsidiary engaged in the same business; 7) the

companies filed consolidated tax returns; 8) the subsidiary was regarded as a
division of the parent; 9) the parent maintained employee benefits for the subsidiary; 10) the parent capitalized and financed the subsidiary; 11) the parent made
business decisions for the subsidiary; 12) the public or trade regarded the parent
and subsidiary as one business unit; 13) the parent paid expenses or losses of the
subsidiary; and 14) the parent and subsidiary made informal intercorporate
loans or book transactions. 718 S.W.2d at 207.
174. Id.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 207.
Id. at 207-08.
Id.
Id.
630 F. Supp. 1540 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
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The Griffins objected to the attempted forfeiture on the grounds that the
property was owned by them and that individually they had entered a preplea agreement with the government to the effect that no forfeiture of their
individual property would be attempted. Upon a trial on the question of
who owned the ranch and other property, the jury found that the Griffins
individually owned it and, therefore, it was not subject to forfeiture.
The government moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
grounds that it would be inequitable to allow Griffins to pierce their own
corporate veil and thereby establish individual ownership of the property in
question. The court held, however, that the Griffins did not rely on such a
theory and that other evidence sufficiently supported the jury's finding that
the Griffins owned the property individually.180 The evidence showed
(1) Bruce Griffin negotiated most of the purchases and profited from all the
money therefor, (2) he held himself out as owner and most people treated
him as such, and (3) the government presented no evidence to show that he
was acting merely as an agent of the corporation.18 1 With regard to the
realty, the court held that, although there was a jury issue as to ownership, it
was raised and decided in Griffin's favor. 82 Furthermore, there was sufficient evidence in support of the verdict to avoid a motion for judgment
83
notwithstanding the verdict.1
Finally, the court held that the government was not entitled to rely on a
corporate veil argument because the law on that subject is designed to protect persons who rely on the existence of a distinct corporate entity, and the
government did not so rely.' 8 4 Furthermore, "[t]he government is not the
type of party intended to be protected by a refusal to pierce a corporate veil,
and Griffin is not the type of party intended to be punished by the same."' 85
In dicta, the court affirmed the rule that shareholders cannot hide behind the
corporate veil, then discard it when it is no longer useful, but stated that
Griffin had never succeeded in hiding behind the corporate veil in the first
place, since the corporations had never owned any of the property.' 8 6
B. Pre-IncorporationProblems
A to Z Rental Center v. Burris 87 involved an individual who signed rental
and sales contracts for his corporation, but failed to disclose the corporate
name. Consequently, the court held him personally liable on the contracts.1 88 On December 30, 1983, Lloyd Burris filed an assumed name certificate in Travis County that indicated that he was doing business as B&S
Construction. On February 25, 1984, Burris and Steve Inscore applied for
180. Id. at 1557.

181. Id.
182. 630 F. Supp. at 1558.

183. Id.
184. Id.

185. Id. at 1559.
186. Id.
187. 714 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
188. Id. at 436.
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credit from A to Z Rental under the firm name of B&S Construction, Inc., a
corporation Burris and Inscore had planned to form. Unable to incorporate
as B&S Construction, Inc. because that name had already been reserved by
another company, Burris and Inscore incorporated as Burris & Inscore Construction, Inc., on March 2, 1985. During April, May and July 1984, B&S
Construction bought or leased equipment from A to Z under various rental
and purchase contracts. On five of these contracts, the line headed "Lessee"
bore Burris's personal signature. In September 1984 Burris & Inscore Construction, Inc. filed an assumed name certificate in Travis County claiming
that the corporation operated under the name of B&S Construction, Inc.
After A to Z failed to receive payments under the contracts, it sued Burris
personally for the amounts owing. The trial court entered a take nothing
judgment against A to Z, and A to Z appealed.
The appellate court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court on
two grounds: first, Burris was liable as an agent in the name of a ficticious or
nonexistent principal with respect to the contracts entered into before the
date of incorporation; second, Burris was liable as an agent of an undisclosed
principal with respect to the contracts entered into after the date of incorporation.18 9 The key factor in the appellate court's eyes was that A to Z had
no knowledge of Burris' true principal, Burris & Inscore Construction,
Inc. 190 The appellate court stated that Burris thus had failed to disclose
sufficient information concerning the identity of his principal to escape personal liability on the contracts.19 1
C. Liability of Corporationfor Acts of its Agents
Ford Motor Co. v. Durril 192 is another in the long line of cases involving
an automobile fuel tank that burst into flames as a result of a rear end collision and inflicted fatal burn injuries on a child passenger. William and Shirley Durrill brought a wrongful death and survival action against Ford Motor
Company following an accident in which their daughter sustained fatal burn
injuries from a fuel tank explosion and fire. The trial court entered judgment, after remittitur, on a jury verdict of approximately $6.8 million actual
damages and $100 million exemplary damages. The exemplary damages
award was based on a finding by the jury that Ford was grossly negligent.
Ford then appealed.
In the appellate court, Ford contended that a corporation, as a matter of
law, may not be held grossly negligent, and therefore, the gross negligence
a
finding became immaterial. Since "the essence of gross negligence is'' 93
mental attitude or state of mind which a corporation itself cannot have,
Ford asserted that it could not be held liable for gross negligence unless the
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 436.
714 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
Id. at 333.

1987]

CORPORATION AND PAR TNERSHIPS

Durrills had produced evidence of knowledge, state of mind, or acts or omissions of an individual Ford employee regarding the design of the fuel tank.
The appellate court reviewed Texas case law and determined that it was
contrary to Ford's argument.1 94 The review showed that corporations may
be held liable for gross negligence without a specific finding that any particular individual was grossly negligent.1 95 The court distinguished this case
from those in which managerial or supervisory personnel authorized or ratified the negligent or intentional conduct that led to corporate liability.1 96
Here, Ford management, as a group, made the complex company policy decisions which led to the design of the fuel tank. The responsibility for the
decision could not be imputed to a specific division, single manager or individual engineer. Accordingly, the court found it proper to hold Ford ac97
countable for gross negligence.'
D. FiduciaryDuty of Full Disclosure
Miller v. Miller198 provided a Texas court with the first opportunity to
address the issue of whether an officer and director of a corporation who
purchases stock from a shareholder of the corporation has a general fiduciary duty to disclose to the shareholder, prior to the purchase of the stock,
any knowledge he may have of information affecting the value of the stock.
The Miller case arose in the context of a separation and the subsequent divorce from his wife of a shareholder, officer and director of a telecommunications equipment company.
Judy and Howard Miller separated on July 15, 1978. During 1978, Howard, along with three other engineers, considered the possibility of forming a
new company to design and manufacture the "IBX," a novel electronic
switching system. In January 1979 the four formed such a company, InteCom, Inc. and each received a twenty-five percent interest therein. Each
twenty-five percent interest was represented by 250 shares of the common
stock of the company. Later, InteCom issued additional shares to the four
founders. The new issue resulted in Howard having a total of 710,355
shares. InteCom then enlisted Exxon Enterprises, Inc. to provide financial
backing, and Exxon agreed to invest $1.5 million in InteCom in exchange for
1.5 million shares of stock. Exxon, which based its investment decision
largely on the four founders' abilities, required in a shareholders' agreement
194. Id.
195. See Ford Motor Co. v. Nowak, 638 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (gross negligence award of $4 million upheld against Ford Motor Company
without predicate of liability upon the acts of individual Ford employees); International Armament Corp. v. King, 674 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984), aff'd, 686 S.W.2d 595
(Tex. 1985) (punitive damages award of $1,500,000 upheld against a corporation that manufactured guns); Rawlings Sporting Goods Co. v. Daniel, 619 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (punitive damage award of $750,000 upheld against a corporation
which manufactured football helmets).
196. 714 S.W.2d at 334.
197. Id. at 338.
198. 700 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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that Howard and his associates remain in control and keep an interest in
InteCom.
On April 10, 1979, Howard filed a petition for divorce. The next day,
Howard gave Judy the shareholders agreement, asking her to take it home
and have it returned to him signed by the next morning. Howard never
explained the agreement to Judy and failed to disclose to her certain information regarding the agreement. Judy read the agreement, signed it, and
never asked Howard or anyone else any questions about it. The agreement
by its terms gave Howard the right to acquire Judy's community interest in
the shares for $2,500.
On August 23, 1980, Howard and Judy were divorced. For approximately two years after the divorce, Judy never complained about the agreement. After reading an electronics magazine, however, Judy discovered that
the stock in InteCom was worth more than she had earlier believed. With
this information, Judy filed suit against Howard on October 20, 1982, seeking rescission of the shareholders agreement and partition of the 710,355
shares owned by Howard at the time of the divorce and alternatively, actual
and exemplary damages. She based these requests for relief on theories of
actual fraud and constructive fraud by breach of a confidential or fiduciary
duty. In Howard's answer to the suit, he denied Judy's interest in the stock
and counterclaimed for attorneys' fees and a decree requiring specific performance of the purchase price. Additionally, Howard attempted to exercise
his option to purchase Judy's shares in the company.
The case was tried to a jury, which found that Howard had made two
false and material misrepresentations to Judy, but that Howard did not
make them with the intention that Judy rely on them in deciding whether to
sign the shareholders' agreement.1 99 The jury also found that Howard had
failed to disclose certain facts to Judy that were material, but, again, without
the intention of inducing Judy to sign the agreement. 2°° In response to the
claim of breach of fiduciary duty brought by Judy against Howard, the jury
found (1) when Howard presented the agreement to Judy, a strict confidential relationship existed between the two; (2) when Howard presented the
agreement to Judy, Howard acted in good faith; and (3) the corporate interest of InteCom was consistent with the stock restrictions placed on Judy by
the agreement pertaining to transfer and ownership of her interest. 20 1 Additionally, the jury found that under the facts and circumstances of the case
20 2
the agreement was not fair to Judy.
199. The false and material representations that Howard made to Judy were that the share-

holders agreement was an agreement between Exxon and the founders that placed certain
restrictions on the stock, and was an agreement to get InteCom started. Id. at 944.
200. The material undisclosed facts were (1) that Exxon had contributed $1.5 million to
InteCom in exchange for 1.5 million shares, (2) that upon the divorce the agreement required
Judy to sell to Howard and others any and all interest that she had in Intecom, (3) that the
shares of the InteCom stock held in Howard's name at that time had a fair cash market value,
and (4) that InteCom was in the process of developing the IBX system, which if successfully
developed would be in great demand. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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The trial court ruled as a matter of law that Judy and Howard held the
710,355 shares of InteCom stock as tenants in common. Since the shares of
InteCom stock had not been divided in the divorce decree, the court ordered
the stock evenly divided between Howard and Judy. However, the trial
court also disregarded certain findings of the jury, validated the shareholders' agreement, and required Judy to sell her shares to Howard at the agreed
price.
Judy appealed the trial court's refusal to rescind the shareholders agreement, contending that the finding of a confidential relationship between
Howard and her established a fiduciary duty on the part of Howard. Judy
additionally argued that this fiduciary duty cast on Howard the burden to
show that the agreement was fair to her and that his failure to discharge the
burden provided sufficient grounds for rescission. The appellate court found
no Texas authority on the issue of whether a person who is an officer and
director of a corporation has a general fiduciary duty to disclose to a stockholder his knowledge of information affecting the value of the stock before
purchasing it from the shareholder. 20 3 The court then turned to the law of
other states for guidance and found a split among those authorities. 20 4
The majority rule is that a director or officer does not stand in a fiduciary
relation with a stockholder in respect to his stock.20 5 Therefore, a director
or officer under the majority rule has the same right as any other shareholder
to trade freely in the corporation's stock.20 6 A significant minority of courts
have held that a director or officer does stand in a fiduciary relation with a
stockholder in respect to his stock. 20 7 Under this rule, a director or officer
cannot properly purchase stock from a stockholder unless he first provides
the stockholder with the benefit of any official knowledge he has of information regarding the value of the stock. 20 8 Still other courts, while recognizing
the majority rule as a general principle, impose on the officer or director a
limited fiduciary duty to disclose any knowledge he has of special facts relating to the business of the corporation-such as mergers, assured sales, etc.which could affect the stock's value. 20 9
The appellate court applied the special facts variation of the majority rule
and concluded that before Howard could contract with Judy regarding the
InteCom stock, he had a duty to disclose to her (1) the details of the Exxon
transaction, and (2) the possibility of an increase in the value of the stock if
203. Id. at 945-46.

204. Id.
205. See Schuur v. Berry, 285 Mich. 654, 281 N.W. 393 (1938); Seitz v. Frey, 152 Minn.
170, 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1168.1, at
283 (rev. perm. ed. 1985).
206. Id.
207. See Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 342, 157 N.W. 929 (1916); Jacobson
v. Yaschik, 249 S.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 601 (1967); 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 205, § 1168.2
at 288-89.

208. Id.
209. 700 S.W.2d at 946; see Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Hobart v. Hobart Estate
Co., 29 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 (1945); 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 205, § 1171, at 293-94.
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InteCom could develop a successful IBX. 210 Howard became aware of these
special facts as a director and officer of the corporation and these facts were
not available to Judy. Based on findings that a confidential relationship existed between Howard and Judy and that Howard failed to disclose special
facts regarding InteCom that were known to him in his official capacity, the
appellate court held that Howard did not deal fairly with Judy in regard to
2 11

his acquiring rights in her shares of InteCom stock.
The second step in the appellate court's analysis was to determine which
party bore the burden of proof concerning the fairness or unfairness of the
shareholders agreement as between Judy and Howard and whether that duty
had been discharged. The court relied on Johnson v. Peckham,2 12 the leading Texas case on this question, which held that a partner selling his interest
in the partnership to another partner did not have the burden to establish
reliance on the purchasing partner to make full and complete disclosure of
all important information as to value. The appellate court applied a presumption of unfairness to transactions between a fiduciary and a party to
whom he owes a fiduciary duty of disclosure and concluded that Howard
had the burden of proving the fairness of the shareholders agreement to
2 13
Judy.
In determining whether Howard had met his burden of proving the fairness of the agreement, the appellate court reviewed Texas case law and concluded that the proper standard was that the fiduciary must show that he
acted in good faith and that the transaction was "fair, honest and equitable."'2 14 The appellate court noted that breach of such a fiduciary duty is
210. 700 S.W.2d at 946.

211. Id.
212. 132 Tex. 148, 120 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1938). Johnson concerned a partner's duty to
disclose to a co-partner, whose interest he was purchasing, facts affecting the value of the
partnership property. Id. In Johnson the supreme court held that because of the fiduciary
relationship, the purchasing partner had the "absolute duty" to disclose to the selling partner
material facts within his knowledge and that such a sale would be sustained "only when it is
made in good faith, for a fair consideration and as full and complete disclosure of all important
information as to value." Id. at 151-52, 120 S.W.2d at 787. Accordingly, the court held that
the selling partner did not have the burden to establish reliance on the purchasing partner to
make such disclosure and that the trial court had properly refused the requested issue inquiring whether the purchaser relied on the seller to make such disclosure. Id.
213. 700 S.W.2d at 946. The appellate court's analysis is consistent with that of other
Texas courts that have cast on the fiduciary the burden to establish fairness. See, e.g., Texas
Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore, 595 S.W.2d 502, 509 (Tex. 1980); Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d
735, 740 (Tex. 1964); Ginther v. Taub, 570 S.W.2d 516, 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). Howard had also contended that he had negated any causal relation between the
nondisclosures and any damage to Judy because Judy admitted on cross-examination that she
would have signed the agreement even if all of the facts had been disclosed. The appellate
court, however, rebuffed Howard's contention by holding that if the facts known to Howard
were material in the sense that a reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances
would attach importance to them in determining his course of conduct or action, then Howard
had a fiduciary duty to disclose them, which could not be excused on the ground that Judy had
failed to establish her reliance on Howard's duty to disclose them. 700 S.W.2d at 948. The
court then went further and stated that based on its reading of Johnson and other relevant
authority, Howard also had the burden to prove that knowledge of these facts would not have
deterred Judy from signing the agreement if, indeed, Howard could be excused from his breach
of fiduciary duty on this ground. Id.
214. 700 S.W.2d at 947. As articulated by the Texas Supreme Court in Stephens County
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commonly referred to as "constructive fraud," and next proceeded to distinguish this case from cases involving constructive fraud in which the party
asserting it bears the entire burden of proof. 215
The appellate court turned to hornbook law and adopted the following
inquiries as relevant considerations in determining whether a transaction between a fiduciary and his beneficiary was fair: (1) Had the fiduciary made
full disclosure? (2) Was the consideration adequate? (3) Was independent
advice available to the beneficiary? (4) Had the fiduciary benefitted or profited at the expense of the beneficiary? 2 16 The appellate court synthesized
these elements into the omnibus rule that a "transaction is unfair if the fiduciary significantly benefits from it at the expense of the beneficiary as viewed
in the light of the circumstances existing at the time of the transaction. '21 7
The appellate court, in light of the above principles, determined that sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that the transaction was unfair
because (1) it was undisputed that Howard did not make full disclosure and
that Judy did not have independent advice, (2) the finding on the adequacy
of the consideration issue, although complicated because of Exxon's participation, was within the province of the jury, and (3) the provisions of the
shareholders' agreement gave Howard rights superior to those of Judy and
21 8
justified the inference that Howard gained a benefit at Judy's expense.
Although the holding in Miller speaks broadly enough to send chills up
the spine of any lender or investment house that has required shareholder
continuity as a condition of its financing, the case's peculiarities should effectively limit its precedential value to situations that bear the same peculiarities. For example, Howard presented no independent evidence regarding
whether the shareholders agreement in its then existing form was a condition
precedent to Exxon's funding of InteCom. 2 19 Based on this lack of evidence,
the court concluded that Exxon might have waived the provisions concerning options on divorce of the founders. 220 Absent independent evidence, the
court held that it had no way of knowing whether the options were required
by Exxon or indispensable to its participation. 221 Similarly, Howard failed to
present any evidence on the issue of whether he had taken advantage of Judy
in having her execute the shareholders agreement. The court inferred that
Howard could have succeeded in proving that the shareholders agreement
was fair to Judy if he presented evidence that he had not gained any benefit
Museum, Inc. v. Swenson, 517 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. 1974), the issues are whether the fiduciary

"had made reasonable use of the confidence placed in him and whether the transactions were
ultimately fair and equitable." 517 S.W.2d at 261.
215. 700 S.W.2d at 947.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 947-48. Regarding the third point underpinning the court's conclusion in this
regard, it appeared particularly important to the appellate court that Howard had an option to
purchase Judy's shares, but Judy had no corresponding option or offsetting benefit. Id. at 948.
219. Id. Although Howard testified that Exxon required the agreement, the court concluded that his testimony, coming from an interested party, did not conclusively establish that

Exxon would not have considered a modification of the agreement. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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from the shareholders agreement at Judy's expense. 222
In terms of planning in light of the holding in Miller, prudence would
dictate that in each instance that an uninformed party is required to sign a
shareholders agreement, the informed parties who are officers or directors of
the corporation or who have a confidential relationship with the spouse
should make it a point to explain all of the relevant provisions in detail. The
informed parties who are officers or directors should also consider hiring
independent legal counsel to represent the uninformed party in connection
with the transaction. Although as a practical matter spouses on good terms
will sign almost anything that the other spouse requests he or she sign, this
case suggests that it is wise to have as much window dressing surrounding
the transaction as possible at one's disposal in the event of subsequent
litigation.
E.

Corporate Opportunity Doctrine

Corporate officers and directors are fiduciaries as to the corporation, and
as such are under an obligation not to usurp corporate opportunities to obtain personal gain. 223 This rule is known as the corporate opportunity doctrine. In Imperial Group (Tex), Inc. v. Scholnick 224 a Canadian real estate
company brought an action to recover profits realized personally by one of
its officers and directors from the purchase and sale of real estate. Ira Scholnick, Imperial's vice president of marketing, research and development since
April 1979, was responsible for all aspects of Imperial's business in the
United States. In the fall of 1982 Scholnick began commuting to Dallas
twice a month for the purposes of reviewing the market and locating land
suitable for apartment development. Between the fall of 1982 and the date
of his resignation from Imperial in the spring of 1984, Scholnick involved
himself in several transactions regarding tracts of land in Dallas that were in
Imperial's line of business. Imperial sued Scholnick for alleged breaches of
fiduciary duty in connection with the transactions and sought to recover
profits realized personally by Scholnick. Additionally, Imperial sought
funds and properties held in his name. The court held that with respect to
one transaction, Scholnick had breached his fiduciary duty of disclosure to
Imperial and was liable to Imperial notwithstanding the fact that Imperial
22 5
would not have pursued the transaction even if it had known about it.
Additionally, the court engaged in a detailed analysis of the corporate opportunity doctrine and the method for determining whether a transaction is
within the normal line of a company's business. 2 26 Although the court's
holding in Imperial breaks no new law, it is a useful reference for analyzing
the exposure of an officer or director of a real estate company who engages in
transactions for his own benefit.
222. Id.
223. International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 576-77 (Tex. 1963).

224. 704 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986 writ ref'd n.r.e.).
225. Id. at 363.
226. Id. at 362-67.
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F Irrevocable Proxies

Under article 2.29(C) of the Texas Business Corporation Act a proxy is
revocable unless it expressly states that it is irrevocable and is "otherwise
made irrevocable by law."'227 Zollar v. Smith 228 is the first Texas case interpreting the requirement that a proxy must otherwise be made irrevocable by
law. Zollar involved whether William C. Smith and George R. Gibbons
could revoke their proxy to Gerald M. Zollar. 229 The proxy stated that it
was for a period of ten years and that it was intended to be an irrevocable
proxy. Smith and Gibbons sued to revoke the proxy. The trial court
granted summary judgment for Smith and Gibbons, and Zollar appealed.
The appellate court reviewed three sources and concluded that in order
for a proxy to be irrevocable, the proxy must either be "coupled with an
interest" or "given as security. '2 30 To determine what constituted "coupled
with an interest" or "given as security" for proxy agreements, the court
turned to the law of agency. The court held that the following three requirements must be met: (1) the agent or proxyholder must have given value,
assumed obligations or incurred liability in connection with the proxy transaction; (2) the principal either must have requested or consented to the foregoing actions of the agent or proxyholder; and (3) the exercise of the proxy
power must be viewed by the agent or proxyholder as a means of reimburse231
ment, indemnity or protection.
Relying on an uncontradicted affidavit by Zollar, the appellate court held
that he met the three requirements. 232 Zollar satisfied the first requirement
as a matter of law by having contributed $1,000 to the corporation so that
the corporation could begin its business. 2 33 This payment constituted a sufficient commitment to the corporation and a substantial parting of value on
behalf of the proxyholder. Zollar satisfied the second requirement as a matter of law by his affidavit, which contained an uncontradicted statement that
he paid his $1,000, plus additional investments, to the corporation at either
the request of Gibbons and Smith, or with their consent.2 3 4 Zollar satisfied
the third requirement as a matter of law also by his affidavit, which stated
that the proxy "was required by me and taken to secure the value tendered

by me ... to [the corporation]

.... ,,235

227. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.09(A) (Vernon 1980).
228. 710 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, no writ).
229. Smith, Gibbons, and Zollar were shareholders in GRG Operating, Inc. The proxy
permitted Zollar to vote the stock of Smith and Gibbons. At the time the parties entered into

the proxy, Zollar was president and a director of the corporation.
230. 710 S.W.2d at 157.
231. Id.at 158.
232. Id.
233. According to Zollar's affidavit, Zollar paid the $1,000 at either the request of Smith
and Gibbons, or with their consent.
234. 710 S.W.2d at 158.
235. Id.
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G. Transfers of Shares
Pesch v. First City Bank 2 36 addressed the question of whether a party
seeking to enforce his right to obtain or reclaim possession of a certificated
security under the Texas Business and Commerce Code must show irreparable harm in order to have a court enjoin the transfer of the security to another person. 237 Despite specific language in the statute that the right "may
be specifically enforced and the transfer ... enjoined, '23 8 the federal district
court concluded that the requirements for obtaining a preliminary injunction
in federal court are a federal procedural standard and, under Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins 239 principles, applied the federal law requirement that the complaining party show irreparable harm.2 40 The court also rejected the complaining party's assertion that his shares had unique characteristics that
entitled him to an injunction.
It is important to note that in reaching its decision the court ignored two
Texas court of appeals cases 24 1 that arguably supported the proposition that
equity will enjoin the transfer of stock shares because the loss of stock shares
represents irreparable injury to a stockholder.2 42 The court concluded that
neither case provided enough facts concerning the stock in question to require the conclusion that the court was Erie-bound to follow them. 24 3 Also,
the court was "not prepared to hold . . . that a shareholder's subjective,
unexplained desire to keep his shares constitutes irreparable injury in each
' 244
and every case.
H. Liquidation
The question faced by the Texas court of appeals in Burnett v. Chase Oil &
Gas, Inc.245 was whether a district court acting under article 7.09 of the
Texas Business Corporation Act may order dissolution of a solvent corporation, and distribute its assets to stockholders, without payment and discharge, or without providing for payment and discharge, of unliquidated or
disputed claims against the corporation. The Burnett case began when a
voting deadlock occurred between the parties, C.C. Burnett and Gaylord
Hughey, Sr. After more than a year of deadlock, Burnett brought suit for a
receiver to be appointed under the Texas Business Corporation Act, 24 6 hoping that the action would rehabilitate the corporation. Hughey crossclaimed and sought the appointment of a receiver for the limited purpose of
liquidating the assets and dissolving the corporation. The receiver attempted
236. 637 F. Supp. 1539 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
237. See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 8.315(c) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
238. 637 F. Supp. at 1542.
239. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
240. 637 F. Supp. at 1546.
241. McDonnell v. Campbell-Taggart Associated Bakeries, Inc., 376 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1964, no writ); Spencer v. James, 31 S.W. 540 (Tex. Civ. App.-1895, no writ).
242. 637 F. Supp. at 1546.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1547.
245. 700 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, no writ).
246. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 7.05 (Vernon 1980).
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to rehabilitate the corporation for eighteen months, but then concluded that
it was impossible and recommended dissolution.
The receiver's report indicated that three lawsuits were pending against
the corporation and recommended that the court assign the corporation's
interest in the suits to the stockholders in their individual capacities. In its
decree, the trial court provided merely that the corporation's assets be distributed according to the receiver's liquidation plan. The trial court made
no special provision for the satisfaction or discharge of the claims against the
corporation represented by the lawsuits.
On appeal Burnett claimed that the trial court erred when it entered its
final order of dissolution without providing for satisfaction of the obligation
created by the pending lawsuits. The court noted that whether a district
court may order such a dissolution without providing for payment of claims
in the form of pending lawsuits was a question of first impression in
Texas. 247 The question before the court was whether article 7.09(A), 248
which required a court to discharge "all debts, obligations, and liabilities"
before ordering dissolution, included provision for discharge of claims from
pending lawsuits.
After a thorough analysis of the statute, the court concluded that under
relevant case law and equitable principles, article 7.09(A) did require a court
to provide for satisfaction of claims based on pending lawsuits before dissolving a solvent corporation. 24 9 The court looked to the law of decedent's estates and bankruptcy in determining the receiver's duty to both pursue
claims on behalf of the corporation as well as to defend it against external
claims. 250 Applying these principles, the court decided that causes of action
against the corporation must be considered among its liabilities. 2 51
In reaching its decision the court also considered the duties of a corporation undergoing a voluntary dissolution under article 6.04 of the Texas Business Corporation Act. 252 The court noted that under article 6.04 a
corporation must prove that it has discharged, or provided for discharge of,
all debts, obligations and liabilities before dissolution. 25 3 A court-ordered
dissolution could scarcely be required to do less, the court reasoned. 254
247. 700 S.W.2d at 739.

248. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.09(A) (Vernon 1980), which addresses involuntary
dissolution, reads:
In proceedings to liquidate the assets and business of a corporation, when the
costs and expenses of such proceedings and all debts, obligations, and liabilities

of the corporation shall have been paid and discharged and all of its remaining

property and assets distributed to its shareholders, or, in case its property and
assets are not sufficient to satisfy and discharge such costs, expenses, debts, and
obligations, when all the property and assets have been applied so far as they
will go to their payment, the court shall enter a decree dissolving the corporation, whereupon the existence of the corporation shall cease.
249. 700 S.W.2d at 740.
250. Id. at 741.
251. Id. at 742.
252. Id. at 741; see TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 6.04 (Vernon 1980).
253. 700 S.W.2d at 744.
254. Id. at 743.
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The court also considered the two traditional principles behind requiring
discharge of all corporate debts before dissolution: protection of creditors,
and orderly and fair distribution of assets to shareholders. 255 To ignore the
court's duty to discharge, or provide for discharge of liabilities such as pending lawsuits, would violate both of these principles. Creditors might be
cheated as corporate assets disappeared, and even if creditors were not
cheated, shareholders with assets in their hands would be forced to assume
more liabilities than shareholders who liquidated their assets. In conclusion,
the court stated that the clear language of the statute and the legislative
intent behind the statute showed that "a clear legislative determination [existed] that provision be made at liquidation for the satisfaction of all existing
liabilities, both absolute and contingent, before distribution of the remaining
'256
assets, if any, to the stockholders.
I. Dissolution and the Trust Fund Doctrine
Thompson v. A.G. Nash & Co., Inc.257 involved a claimant who sought to
enforce a judgment against a corporation that has been dissolved during the
original litigation and against the corporation's shareholders. On August 6,
1981, A.G. Nash & Company (Nash) commenced litigation against Van Insurance Agency, Inc. (Old Van). Without Nash's knowledge, the directors
and shareholders of Old Van had changed its name to Van County Insurance Agency, Inc. (New Van), and voluntarily dissolved New Van on September 24, 1982. On July 14, 1983, the court signed and entered a summary
judgment in the litigation in favor of Nash against Old Van for approximately $4,700. Each shareholder received cash from the dissolution of New
Van in excess of $4,700. On September 21, 1983, Nash filed a suit against
New Van and its shareholders to recover the money Old Van owed to Nash.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Nash. The shareholders appealed.
The dissolution provisions of the Texas Business Corporation Act controlled the appellate court's disposition of the appeal. 25 8 Particularly important was article 7.12, which provides that the voluntary dissolution of a
corporation "shall not take away or impair any remedy available to or
against such corporation, its officers, directors, or shareholders, for any right
or claim existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution if action
or other proceedings thereon are commenced within three years after the
date of such dissolution. ' 259 The appellate court noted that although the
shareholders dissolved the corporation during the pendency of the proceedings, the shareholders continued to defend the suit in the corporate name
and the trial court rendered judgment against the corporation. Under these
facts, the appellate court held that the judgment fixed the liability of the
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id.
Id. at 745.
704 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, no writ).
Id. at 824.
TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 7.12 (Vernon 1980).
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shareholders to the extent that each received cash or property of the corporation in distribution of its assets upon dissolution. 26° The summary judgment evidence established that when the corporation dissolved, each
shareholder received funds in excess of the judgment against the corporation
in violation of the Texas Business Corporation Act. Accordingly, the appel261
late court affirmed the trial court's judgment.
J. Derivative Actions
Renfro v. FederalDeposit Insurance Company 262 involved a federal court's
dismissal of a shareholders' derivative action in the context of a failed national bank. The shareholders of National Bank of Odessa, a national bank
under the receivership of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), notified the FDIC of their intention to sue the former officers and
directors of the bank to recover damages the shareholders incurred as a result of the bank failure. The notice also called upon the FDIC to bring suit
against the bank's former officials "[i]n the event that the FDIC owns the
causes of action. '2 63 Two months later the shareholders filed a complaint
alleging that they had received no response to their demand. The FDIC,
acting as receiver, removed the case to federal court, moved to intervene,
and sought dismissal of the shareholders' action. The trial court granted the
motions, allowing the FDIC to bring its own actions, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.264
On appeal the shareholders contended that the FDIC's alleged failure to
answer their demand letter justified their bringing a derivative action. The
Fifth Circuit overruled their claims, citing the well known principle that a
derivative action is a remedy of last resort by shareholders to enforce corporate actions.2 65 The court noted that, before shareholders may bring a derivative action, they must have exhausted all the means possible for them to
266
obtain redress.
The court held that the shareholders' complaint had failed to show their
efforts, if any, to obtain relief from the directors, and why the relief was
unavailable.2 67 The court noted that in their complaint the shareholders had
merely alleged that in April 1984 they had made two demands on the FDIC
to file suit, and that they filed suit in June without further contact when the
FDIC failed to respond to their demands. 268 These allegations were insufficient since the shareholders had not claimed that the FDIC had refused to
260. 704 S.W.2d at 824.
261. Id.
262. 773 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1985).
263. Id. at 658.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 659 (citing Hawes v. Contra Costa Water Co., 104 U.S. 450 (1882)). This result
obtains because only the corporation has standing to sue both those inside and outside the
corporation for actionable wrongs committed against it. Id. (citing Note, Demand on Directors
and Shareholdersas a Prerequisiteto a Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV. 746, 748 (1960)).
267. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1).
268. Id.
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proceed or that the FDIC was not acting in good faith. The shareholders
had alleged only that the FDIC did not respond to their demand. When the
court dismissed the shareholders' suit, the FDIC brought its own suit on
behalf of the corporation against the bank officials on the same grounds.
The court in its opinion emphasized both the need for shareholders to
pursue seriously an intracorporate remedy before attempting to bring a derivative action and the requirement that shareholders expend reasonable efforts to assist the corporation in bringing suit. 269 The court held that the
bank's shareholders failed to expend these efforts, noting that the shareholders had only informed the FDIC of the identity of the prospective defendants. 270 The shareholders had not given the FDIC any factual allegations to
support their claims of wrongdoing by bank officials, but instead had made
only conclusory charges. The shareholders' demand letter also contained
every hint that they might share their information with the FDIC, if the
FDIC acted promptly in filing suit.
The court held that the shareholders' efforts to make the FDIC file suit
were pro forma and, therefore, inadequate as a matter of law, because (1) the
demand letter merely informed the FDIC of the shareholders' intent to file
suit without asking for a response and (2) the shareholders took no action to
assist the FDIC in their investigation. 271 Finally, the court noted that the
FDIC was properly bringing the suit that the shareholders sought. 272 In
light of these facts the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the shareholders' suit. 273
K. Municipal Corporation
In Gates v. City of Dallas2 74 the Texas Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether a municipal corporation could be held liable for statutory attorneys' fees in connection with its wrongful retention of health insurance benefits from one of its employees. Charles Gates, a city employee, sued the City
of Dallas for unpaid health insurance benefits. The trial court, in a partial
summary judgment, allowed the employee to receive the unpaid accrued
benefits. Additionally, the parties agreed, in partial settlement, that the city
would pay future claims under the plan. The sole issue that went to trial
involved the determination of the recovery of attorneys' fees.
The trial court, relying on article 2226275 of the Texas Revised Civil and
article 1.14-1(7),276 of the Texas Insurance Code required the city to pay
$120,000 as the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees. The city appealed the
trial court's judgment, and the court of appeals reversed the award of attorneys' fees and affirmed the trial court decision in all other respects. Gates
269. Id.
270. Id.

271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. at 660.
Id.
Id.
704 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. 1986).

275. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon 1970).
276. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.14-1(7) (Vernon 1970).
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then appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. The supreme court reviewed the
relevant case law and legislation and concluded that municipal corporations
involved in proprietary functions were intended by the legislature to fall
within article 2226.277 The court stated that the underlying purpose of the
statute is to encourage contracting parties to acknowledge and pay their
debts and to discourage parties from pursuing the very type of unnecessary
litigation in which the city forced Gates to engage. 2 78 Accordingly, the
Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the court of appeals for a determination of the sole issue of whether the amount of the
attorneys' fees awarded by the trial court was reasonable. 279
L. Service of Process Under the Texas Long-Arm Statute
Fairmount Homes, Inc. v. Upchurch280 involved whether specific pleadings filed in connection with a DTPA action alleged facts that, if true, would
make the opposing party amenable to process under the Texas long-arm statute. 281 The controversy arose because the plaintiff pleaded merely that the
defendant did not maintain a place of regular business in Texas and had no
designated agent on whom service of citation could be made, rather than
expressly alleging that the defendant was a foreign corporation. The court
concluded that this deficiency was not fatal because the allegations gave the
defendant adequate notice of the pending suit and sufficiently put the defendant on notice that the plaintiff was suing a foreign corporation. 282 The court
held that if it is apparent from the petition that a foreign corporation is
involved, it is not necessary to allege in the petition that a foreign corpora28 3
tion is the defendant.
M, Liability Arisingfrom Impaired or Terminated CorporatePrivileges
Under Texas law a corporation can forfeit its corporate privileges through
failure to pay Texas franchise taxes. 28 4 One consequence of the forfeiture of
those privileges is that the corporation is denied the right to sue in state
court. 28 5 The corporation may, however, revive its privileges and its access
to the courts by obtaining reinstatement of its corporate charter through
payment of delinquent franchise taxes.286 Midwest Mechanical Contractors,
277. 704 S.W.2d at 740.
278. Id.

279. Id.
280. 704 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), modified, 711 S.W.2d 618 (Tex.
1986).
281. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 203 lb-3 (Vernon 1964) repealed and superseded by
TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.044 (1986). This provision appoints the secretary
of state as the registered agent for any foreign corporation that does business in the state
without maintaining a regular place of business or designated agent for service of process in the
state. For a discussion of the requirement of a factual allegation supporting jurisdiction, see
Whitney v. L&L Realty Corporation, 500 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1973).
282. 704 S.W.2d at 524.
283. Id.
284. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.251 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
285. Id. § 171.252 (Vernon 1982).
286. Id. §§ 171.253.313-314.
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Inc. v. Commonwealth Construction Co. 287 involved whether the revival of a
corporation's privileges retroactively validated its motion for a stay of litigation until after arbitration. The court noted that Texas law did not clearly
answer the question and that other jurisdictions have reached differing conclusions under similar statutes regarding the effect of revival of a corporate
charter upon actions taken during the period of revocation. 28 8 However,
Texas courts have construed the denial of access provision as allowing the
assertion or granting of purely negative defenses or defensive relief.289 The
court concluded that a request for defensive relief is generally sought in a
motion for a stay and, therefore, avoided the retroactivity issue. 290 The
court held that the motion to stay litigation until after arbitration was
valid. 29 1 The Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion regarding a motion for stay of arbitration in Ommani v. Doctor's Associates, Inc.,292 which involved a foreign corporation that had no
Texas Certificate of Authority to transact business in the state.
A second consequence of forfeiture of corporate privileges is that each
director or officer of the corporation becomes personally liable for each debt
of the corporation that is incurred or created in Texas after the event giving
rise to the forfeiture occurs and before the corporate privileges are revived. 29 3 River Oaks Shopping Center v. Pagan294 involved the issue of
whether a debt of a corporation arising from a lease contract for real property was created or incurred after the corporation forfeited its right to do
business in Texas. The court noted that Texas law was clear that "the liability imposed under the statute is only for debts contracted after the forfeiture
of the right to do business and has no application to the renewal of obligations arising prior thereto. ' 295 Furthermore, precedent exists for the proposition that if a lease agreement is executed before the corporation forfeited its
right to do business, the corporation's debt will relate back to the promise to
pay made in the leasing agreement. 296 Accordingly, the court concluded
that the obligation to pay rent under the lease agreement evidenced an intent
287. 801 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1986).
288. Id. at 752.

289. Id. See Rimco Enter. v. Texas Elec. Serv. Co., 599 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bryan v. Cleveland Sand & Gravel Co., 139 S.W.2d 612,
613 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1940, writ ref'd); Maloney Mercantile Co. v. Johnson County
Say. Bank, 121 S.W. 889, 890 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ).
290. 801 F.2d at 752.
291. Id. The court pointed out the difference between a mere motion to stay proceedings
pending arbitration and a petition to compel arbitration. The court suggested that even the
latter may be available to a corporate party that has forfeited its corporate privileges under
state law, since only Congress has the prerogative of defining the jurisdiction of federal courts.
Id.
292. 789 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1986).
293. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255 (Vernon 1982). The liability of a director or officer
is in the same manner and to the same extent as if the director or officer were a partner and the
corporation were a partnership.
294. 712 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
295. Id. at 192, see Schwab v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp., 145 Tex. 379, 382, 198
S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex. 1946).
296. See Curry Auto Leasing v. Byrd, 683 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).

1987]

CORPORATION AND PAR TNERSHIPS

that each party, upon the signing of the instrument, would have immediately
vested rights that would be binding and given full force after its execution. 297
The court added that the obligation to pay rent was created or incurred at
the time the parties executed the lease agreement, notwithstanding the fact
that the rent became payable in advance on the first day of each month of
298
the lease term.

III.

SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS

A.

FederalLaw Developments

1. Tender Officers; SEC Amendments to Rule 13e-4 and Regulations 14D
and 14E. In Securities Act Release No. 33-6653299 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted amendments to the rules governing issuer and third-party tender offers. The amendments made three significant
modifications to existing law. First, the amendments require that an issuer
or third-party tender offer must extend to all persons owning shares of the
class of securities subject to the offer. This provision is known as the "allholders" rule. The SEC originally proposed the all-holders rule in 1985 in
response to the federal district court's decision in Unocal Corp. v. Pickens.3°°
In Unocal the court upheld the action of a corporate issuer faced with a
hostile tender offer in making a defensive self-tender offer to all of the shareholders except the hostile holder. The amendment enacting the all-holders
rule was effective immediately. Second, the amendments require that all
tendering security holders must be paid the highest consideration offered to
any other security holder during the offer. This requirement provides for the
equivalent of the "most favored nation" treatment to all tendering security
holders. Third, the amendments revised the existing rules concerning minimum offering periods and withdrawal rights. The two latter amendments
became effective August 18, 1986.
2. Recovery of Damages. Randall v. Loftsgaarden30 1 involved whether a
rescissionary damages recovery by a defrauded tax shelter investor must be
reduced by any tax benefits the investor received from the investment. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held in an en banc decision that such tax
benefits represented income received which was required to be offset against
the investor's recovery under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act). The court also held that the "actual damages" limitation of
Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) requires that tax benefits be deducted from any rescissionary recovery made
under section 10 of the Exchange Act. 30 2 The investors successfully peti-

tioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
297. 712 S.W.2d at 192.

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id.
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,016 (1986).
608 F. Supp. 1081 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
106 S. Ct. 3143, 92 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1986).
Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 768 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1985).
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Supreme Court reversed, holding that a defrauded tax shelter investor who
recovers recissionary damages under section 12(2) of the Securities Act or
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act need not deduct his tax benefits from his
recovery of recissionary damages. 30 3 In so holding, the Court effectively allowed the defrauded tax shelter investor to receive both his money back
3°
from the investment and any tax benefits therefrom. 4
3. Statute ofLimitations. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 does
not fix a specific period of limitations within which a private litigant must
bring a suit for damages, and no federal statute of limitations is generally
applicable to private suits for damages under rule lOb-5. Courts, however,
have fixed appropriate limitations periods as a matter of federal common
law. Five years ago in Wood v. Combustion Engineering,Inc., 3°5 the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the appropriate statute of
limitations period for lOb-5 claims in Texas was two years. 30 6 In Corwin v.
Marney, Orten Investments 30 7 the Fifth Circuit was called upon to reconsider the Wood decision in the context of a suit brought by investors who lost

money in an office building project. The appellate court held that the 1977
and 1979 amendments to the Texas blue sky law did not alter the conclusion
reached in Wood because the two major considerations of Wood-reliance
and scienter-had not changed. 30 8 The appellate court recognized, however,
that the three subsidiary factors of Wood have all changed. 30 9 First, the
Texas blue sky law now includes a due diligence defense. Second, sellers
have remedies available, as well as buyers. Third, a new provision specified
that tender made at any time prior to entry of a judgment would satisfy the
requirement of tender as a prerequisite to recovery. The court held that
"[w]hile these subsidiary considerations make the Blue Sky law marginally
more similar to lOb-5, we do not find the essential pillars of Wood to be
weakened. '' 310 Accordingly, the appellate court found no difficulty in reaffirming Wood and holding that the statute of limitations period for lOb-5
311
actions was two years.

B. State law Developments
1. Liability as Seller of Securities. In Dahl v. Pinter31 2 the Fifth Circuit
303. 106 S. Ct. at 3155, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 544.
304. The apparent windfall to the defrauded tax shelter investor is somewhat illusory because the investor must subsequently pay federal income tax on the amount of his recovery.

305. 643 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981).
306. Id. at 346.
307. 788 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1986).
308. Id. at 1067.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 1067-68.
311. Id. at 1068. Interestingly, the two-year statute of limitations addressed in both Wood
and Corwin has been amended to four years since the cause action arose in Corwin. See TEx.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon Supp. 1987). It remains to be seen whether
federal courts will begin to apply the new four-year statute of limitations for lOb-5 claims
brought in Texas.
312. 787 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, - U.S. - (1987).
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Court of Appeals considered whether an uninformed but enthusiastic layman, who knowingly encouraged friends and family to purchase unregistered securities, was precluded from recovering his investment under the
doctrines of unclean hands, in pari delicto, or estoppel. The court also considered whether that same layman was a seller of securities. Dahl purchased
certain oil and gas investments, and encouraged his friends and family to
purchase similar investments from Pinter. Dahl's enthusiasm for the investments was critical in obtaining the sales. Dahl helped every other purchaser
to sign their contracts, which stated that the securities were unregistered.
There was no evidence, however, that Dahl knew it was illegal not to register
securities.
When the investments turned sour Dahl and his fellow investors sued
Pinter under federal and state securities laws. The federal district court allowed the investors to recover the purchase price of the securities, holding
that the securities were illegal because of Pinter's failure to register them.
Pinter appealed, claiming that section 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933
classified Dahl as a "seller," thereby, implicating Dahl as being also liable.
Pinter also alleged that the equitable doctrines of unclean hands, in pari
delicto and estoppel barred Dahl from recovery.
First, the appellate court held that the equitable defenses of unclean
hands, in pari delicto and estoppel did not prevent Dahl from recovering
against Pinter.31 3 The court reasoned that, even though Dahl knew that the
securities were unregistered, he did not know that the lack of registration
was a violation of the securities laws. As a consequence, Dahl did not engage in any culpable conduct which would preclude him from recovery for
having unclean hands or for being in pari delicto. The court also held that
estoppel did not bar Dahl from recovery since allowing his suit would not
314
frustrate the purposes of the Securities Act.
Second, the appellate court held that, although Dahl technically fit the
definition of a seller of securities, his conduct did not fall within the purview
of the statute. 31 5 Dahl was technically a seller of securities because his participation in the sales transaction was a substantial factor in causing the
transaction to take place. The fact that Dahl did not know the sale was
illegal did not protect him from liability; however, the court reasoned that
the Securities Act was not intended to punish a seller of securities who does
so, not for profit or personal benefit, but for the benefit of the buyer. 3 16 The
court stated "[w]e believe that a rule imposing liability (without fault or
knowledge) on friends and family members who give one another gratuitious
advice on investment matters unreasonably interferes with well established
patterns of social discourse. Absent express direction by Congress, we decline to impose liability for mere gregariousness. 3 1 7 The court likewise
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id. at 988.
Id. at 989-90.
Id. at 991.
Id.
Id.
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found that Dahl was not a seller under the Texas securities law and affirmed
318
the district court's refusal to assess damages against Dahl.
Circuit Judge Brown dissented, arguing that Dahl was indeed a seller
under the Securities Act, since he was the motivating force behind the investors' purchases. 3 19 Brown noted that the statute only requires that the seller
be a "substantial factor" in bringing about the sale-no culpability is required. 320 In order to protect the public, Brown reasoned, even ignorant
sellers like Dahl must be held liable. Brown also argued that Dahl's role in
bringing about the sale made him "mutually at fault" so that Dahl should be
barred from recovery against Pinter under the in pari delicto defense. 32 1 In
conclusion, Brown argued that allowing persons such as Dahl to knowingly
sell unregistered securities, without being liable, endangers the public and
encourages securities law violations. 322 Brown contended that the majority
result in Dahl thus allows "sophisticated investors" like Dahl to invest safely
in and sell unregistered securities. 32 3 If the investment succeeds, Dahl reaps
a profit, and if it fails, he is safe from liability. Allowing this kind of result is
therefore against the public interest and encourages violation of securities
law. Brown thus supported a strict liability application of the securities laws
324
to the situation at hand.
C. Regulation of Brokers and Dealers
1. Magnum Corp. v. Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc. 32 5 involved the
fiduciary duty of a broker to his investors. Lehman Brothers contacted magnum Corporation and other purchasers about buying stock in RPM, Inc.
Magnum was interested and agreed to buy 32,000 shares at $13.375 a share.
The orders did not have an exact price or time limitation. Shortly after
Magnum agreed to buy the shares, Lehman Brothers decided to begin buying RPM stock for its own account. This decision crowded the market and
caused the price of RPM to rise to $15.75 a share. Lehman Brothers did not
inform Magnum of the price change or of its role in the change, but proceeded to buy the 32,000 shares at $15.75 a share. Magnum and the other
investors complained unsuccessfully and then brought suit.
The trial court found that Lehman Brothers breached its fiduciary duty to
Magnum by failing to inform Magnum of the change in the market's condition due to their entry. The court awarded the plaintiffs $76,000 in damages,
the difference between what they actually paid ($15.75 a share) and what
they should have paid ($13.375 a share). The Fifth Circuit affirmed, stating
that Magnum and the other plaintiffs were entitled to be told about Lehman
Brothers' entry into the market and the resulting change in its condition, so
318. Id.

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id. at 994 (Brown, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 995.
794 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1986).
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249

they could choose not to buy RPM stock, to buy less, or to place their orders
326
somewhere else.

326. Id. at 201.

